

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36719/2706-6185/55/113-120>

Emil Golumb

Academy of Public Administration under the
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Master's student
<https://orcid.org/0009-0003-4004-0568>
qolumbemil@gmail.com

State Personnel Policy and the Administrative-Political Elite: Interconnections, Challenges, and Contemporary Trends

Abstract

The structure, functions, and role of the administrative-political elite in public administration are important factors. State personnel policy is considered one of the main means of elite formation and activity and also ensures the continuity of the elite through recruitment and re-formation mechanisms. Various theoretical approaches—classical, functional, institutional, and neo-elitist—form the basis of the effectiveness of public administration and personnel policy. Modern trends, innovations, digitalization, and the application of ethical principles increase the professionalism of the elite and the efficiency of management. Personnel policy based on open, transparent, and meritocratic principles strengthens the stability and legitimacy of public administration. As a result, a professional administrative-political elite and effective personnel policy play an important role in the strategic development of the state.

Keywords: *civil service, personnel policy, training and development, innovation and digitalization, principle of meritocracy, public administration, effective management, recruitment and reproduction of the elite*

Emil Qolumb

Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin yanında
Dövlət İdarəçilik Akademiyası
magistrant
<https://orcid.org/0009-0003-4004-0568>
qolumbemil@gmail.com

Dövlət kadr siyasəti və inzibati-siyasi elita: qarşılıqlı əlaqələr, problemlər və müasir tendensiyalar

Xülasə

İnzibati-siyasi elitanın strukturu, funksiyaları və dövlət idarəçiliyində rolu əhəmiyyətli amillərdən biridir. Dövlət kadr siyasəti elitanın formalaşması və fəaliyyətinin əsas vasitələrindən hesab olunur, həmçinin rekrutment və təkrar formalaşma mexanizmləri vasitəsilə elitənin davamlılığını təmin edir. Müxtəlif nəzəri yanaşmalar — klassik, funksional, institusional və neo-elitist — dövlət idarəçiliyi və kadr siyasətinin effektivliyinin əsasını təşkil edir. Müasir tendensiyalar, innovasiyalar, rəqəmsallaşma və etika prinsiplərinin tətbiqi elitanın peşəkarlığını və idarəetmənin səmərəliliyini artırır. Açıq, şəffaf və meritokratik prinsiplərə əsaslanan kadr siyasəti dövlət idarəçiliyinin dayanıqlığını və legitimliyini gücləndirir. Nəticədə, peşəkar inzibati-siyasi elita və effektiv kadr siyasəti dövlətin strateji inkişafı üçün mühüm rol oynayır.

Açar sözlər: *dövlət xidməti, kadr siyasəti, təlim və inkişaf, innovasiya və rəqəmsallaşma, meritokratiya prinsipi, dövlət idarəçiliyi, effektiv idarəetmə, elitanın işə qəbulu və təkrar istehsalı*

Introduction

Modern public administration is impossible without the effective functioning of the administrative-political elite, which represents a group of individuals occupying key positions within the system of state power and determining the strategic directions of national development. The role of this elite is particularly significant in the formation and implementation of state personnel policy, since it is precisely this group that ensures the selection, placement, and development of managerial staff who directly influence the efficiency of the state apparatus (Mosca, 2001, pp. 45–50). In the context of intensifying globalization and the ongoing transformation of political systems, the question of the place and functions of the administrative-political elite acquires particular relevance.

The concept of “elite” in political science discourse has a long history and a multifaceted content. Vilfredo Pareto defined the elite as a set of individuals possessing the highest indicators of effectiveness in their respective fields of activity and capable of exerting a decisive influence on social processes (Pareto, 1990, pp. 62–68). Gaetano Mosca, in turn, emphasized that in any society there always exists an organized minority that governs an unorganized majority, and it is this group that forms the ruling class (Mosca, 2001, pp. 71–74). Robert Michels, in his *iron law of oligarchy*, argued that even democratic organizations inevitably produce an elite that concentrates power in its own hands over time (Michels, 1987, pp. 83–89). These classical concepts laid the foundation for the modern understanding of the administrative-political elite as a stable, hierarchically organized structure that plays a key role in the governance of the state.

In the context of state personnel policy, the administrative-political elite performs not only managerial but also selective functions. It determines the criteria of professional suitability, shapes institutional mechanisms for recruitment and career advancement, and sets moral and normative guidelines for the entire civil service system (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 92–97). The success of implementing state programs, the quality of decision-making, and the level of public trust in governmental institutions largely depend on the degree of development and professionalism of this elite. Thus, the effectiveness of personnel policy directly correlates with the condition and functioning of the administrative-political elite.

Contemporary researchers note that the administrative-political elite is not monolithic in nature. It encompasses various strata, including political leaders, senior civil servants, representatives of local authorities, heads of state-owned enterprises, and leaders of strategic institutions (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 114–118). Each of these strata performs specific functions; however, taken together, they form an integrated mechanism of governance. An important factor is the existence of interaction mechanisms among these levels, which makes it possible to ensure continuity and stability in state policy (Kara-Murza, 2015, pp. 128–133).

The specific features of elite functioning within personnel policy are manifested primarily in the principles of recruitment and career advancement. Under democratic institutions, priority is given to professionalism, competence, and the openness of personnel procedures, whereas in authoritarian systems a decisive role is often played by personal loyalty and devotion (Huntington, 2003, pp. 145–150). However, even in democratic states, the elite tends to reproduce itself through informal networks, corporate solidarity, and institutional control over personnel processes (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 161–166). Thus, personnel policy becomes not only an instrument for forming a professional state apparatus but also a mechanism for the self-renewal of the elite.

For states of the post-Soviet space, including Azerbaijan, a combination of traditional and modernization-oriented features in elite functioning is characteristic. On the one hand, elements of patron–client relations persist, in which personnel appointments depend on personal connections and political loyalty. On the other hand, elements of a meritocratic model based on the principles of professionalism and transparency are gradually being introduced (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 172–179). This transitional nature of personnel policy reflects the broader process of institutional development and the state’s aspiration to enhance the effectiveness of governance.

It should be noted that in recent years there has been a growing tendency toward strengthening the role of the administrative-political elite in strategic planning and the development of state reforms.

In particular, the participation of the elite in personnel policy is manifested through the establishment of specialized commissions, personnel reserves, and institutions for assessing the competencies of civil servants (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 201–207). Such measures contribute to the institutionalization of personnel processes and to the reinforcement of the principle of professional accountability.

The present study is aimed at a theoretical and methodological interpretation of the phenomenon of the administrative-political elite, as well as an analysis of its structure, functions, and role in the formation of state personnel policy. The purpose of the work is to identify the regularities of elite functioning as an institution of state power, to determine its influence on personnel processes, and to propose possible directions for improving the mechanisms of recruitment and development of civil servants under contemporary conditions.

Research

In academic literature, the concept of the “administrative-political elite” is regarded as a key category for analyzing the mechanisms of state power and personnel policy. In this context, the elite is understood as a relatively stable group of individuals possessing power resources, professional competencies, and institutional status that enable them to make strategic decisions determining the direction of state development (Pareto, 1990, pp. 45–49). The founders of elite theory, such as V. Pareto, G. Mosca, and R. Michels, proceeded from the inevitability of the existence of an elite as a governing minority concentrating political power in its hands. They argued that an elite emerges naturally in any society where there is a need for organized governance (Mosca, 2001, pp. 52–56).

The structure of the administrative-political elite is complex and hierarchical in nature. At its upper level is the political elite, comprising individuals who make key decisions in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 70–75). The intermediate level is formed by senior civil servants and heads of ministries, agencies, and state committees. Finally, the lower level consists of representatives of regional and municipal administrations who ensure the implementation of political decisions at the local level. This multilevel structure ensures the integrity of public administration and the coordination of interests across different levels of power (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 80–85).

A special place in the analysis of the administrative-political elite is occupied by the issue of its recruitment. Two main mechanisms of elite reproduction can be identified: meritocratic and patronage-based. The former is grounded in the professional and personal qualities of candidates, their competencies, and work experience, while the latter relies on systems of personal connections, loyalty, and affiliation with specific political groups (Huntington, 2003, pp. 92–96). In practical reality, especially in post-Soviet states, a mixed model is observed in which both principles are combined, which has a direct impact on the level of effectiveness of state personnel policy (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 103–106).

The functions of the administrative-political elite are diverse and encompass the key directions of public governance. First and foremost, this includes the function of strategic leadership, which consists in defining the priorities of state policy and developing long-term development programs (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 114–118). This is followed by the normative-regulatory function associated with the drafting and implementation of legal and regulatory acts governing social relations. The coordination function is aimed at harmonizing the interests of different branches and levels of government. Finally, the personnel function involves the formation and renewal of the corps of civil servants who ensure the stability and continuity of the state mechanism (Kara-Murza, 2015, pp. 125–129).

Contemporary researchers emphasize that the effective functioning of the administrative-political elite is impossible without a high level of professional culture and responsibility. The elite must possess not only political influence but also competencies in public management, economic analysis, and strategic forecasting (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 136–140). At the same time, its activities should be based on the principles of legality, transparency, and accountability to society. Violations of these principles lead to distortions in the personnel system, the spread of corruption, and a decline in public trust in government institutions (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 148–151).

The study of the administrative-political elite relies on a wide range of theoretical approaches developed within political science during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Each of these approaches offers its own explanation of the nature, origins, and functioning of the elite, as well as its influence on the processes of public governance. Among the most significant are the classical elitist, institutional, functional, neo-elitist, and network approaches (Mosca, 2001, pp. 47–50).

The classical elitist approach, developed by V. Pareto, G. Mosca, and R. Michels, asserts the inevitability of the existence of a ruling minority that concentrates power in its hands. Pareto viewed the elite as a group of individuals possessing the highest abilities and competencies in the political sphere, who naturally rise to positions of authority (Pareto, 1990, pp. 53–57). Mosca emphasized that governance always belongs to an organized minority capable of controlling the majority (Mosca, 2001, pp. 60–63). R. Michels, in turn, explained the stability of elites through the “iron law of oligarchy,” according to which any organization, even a democratic one, inevitably produces its own governing group (Michels, 1987, pp. 68–72).

The institutional approach focuses on the role of formal institutions—state structures, political parties, and bureaucracy—in the formation of the elite. According to this perspective, the elite is a product of the institutional environment in which personnel policy, legal norms, and administrative procedures define the rules of access to power (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 84–87). In this context, the administrative-political elite appears not only as a social group but also as an integral part of the state mechanism, embedded within a system of institutional relations (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 90–93).

The functional approach examines the elite through the roles it performs, including managerial, normative-regulatory, coordination, and personnel functions. The central issue here is the elite’s capacity to ensure stability, continuity, and effectiveness of power and governance (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 99–102).

Contemporary scholars further develop neo-elitist and network approaches that emphasize the interconnectedness of the elite with various social and economic actors. According to P. Bourdieu, elite power is formed through different forms of capital—economic, cultural, and social—which enable the maintenance of control over resources and the reproduction of a dominant position (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 111–114). The network approach complements this view by describing the elite as a set of interacting actors united by informal ties and shared interests (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 120–123).

Thus, theoretical approaches to the study of the administrative-political elite demonstrate its multidimensional nature, ranging from structural hierarchies to network-based forms of interaction. Their synthesis makes it possible to develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the elite, its role in state personnel policy, and the mechanisms through which power is reproduced.

One of the key aspects of how the administrative-political elite functions is the mechanism of its recruitment and renewal. The way these processes are organized directly affects the stability of the state system, its ability to respond to new challenges, and its capacity to ensure continuity in the leadership of public administration (Mosca, 2001, pp. 45–49). Recruitment refers to the process of selecting and integrating new members into the elite, while reproduction reflects the elite’s ability to maintain and refresh its composition without compromising institutional and ideological cohesion (Pareto, 1990, pp. 52–55).

Classical elite theories identify two main types of recruitment: open and closed. In an open model, entry into the elite is determined through formal procedures based on professionalism, competence, and merit. This system is typical of democratic societies, where meritocratic principles prevail and personnel policies are guided by transparent institutional mechanisms (Michels, 1987, pp. 63–66). In contrast, a closed model relies on personal loyalty, political allegiance, and affiliation with specific social or political circles. This approach is more characteristic of authoritarian and transitional regimes, where staffing decisions are made within a limited inner circle (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 71–74).

Contemporary researchers note that in most states a mixed type of recruitment is observed, where formal criteria are combined with informal selection practices (Huntington, 2003, pp. 80–83). In such

systems, patronage relationships, personal networks, and corporate solidarity play a significant role, helping to form stable managerial networks within the elite (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 91–94).

The reproduction of the elite is linked to mechanisms for transferring power and influence between generations of administrators. This can occur through state personnel reserves, professional training systems, as well as informal channels such as family ties, regional connections, and corporate networks (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 100–104). The effectiveness of these mechanisms largely depends on the level of institutional development in the state and the transparency of its personnel policies.

In the context of post-Soviet states, including Azerbaijan, elite recruitment and reproduction processes are transitional in nature. On one hand, traditional patronage elements persist; on the other hand, meritocratic principles based on professional qualifications and open competitive procedures are gradually gaining influence (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 112–115).

Thus, the mechanisms of recruitment and reproduction within the administrative-political elite play a decisive role in ensuring both the stability and adaptability of the state system. An optimal combination of formal and informal selection principles allows for the renewal of leadership personnel while maintaining institutional stability and the effectiveness of governance.

State personnel policy is one of the key tools for shaping and sustaining the administrative-political elite. It directly affects the quality of public administration and the effectiveness of achieving the state's strategic goals (Mosca, 2001, pp. 47–50). Personnel policy represents a system of principles, norms, and mechanisms aimed at selecting, developing, promoting, and evaluating civil servants, ensuring the formation of a competent and capable administrative corps (Solovyov, pp. 55–59). Through these policies, not only is the professional growth of public officials supported, but the elite itself is reproduced, maintaining its stability and ability to adapt.

From the perspective of public administration theory, personnel policy performs three main functions. First, it governs the selection and placement of personnel, aimed at building a professional elite capable of implementing strategic objectives. Second, it fulfills a motivational role, fostering the development of personnel potential and stimulating professional competence. Third, it serves a supervisory and regulatory function, evaluating the effectiveness of civil servants and adjusting personnel decisions accordingly (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 63–66). In this way, personnel policy acts as a vital link between the administrative apparatus and the broader political institutions.

In classical elite theories, personnel policy is seen as a mechanism for legitimizing and reproducing the elite. According to V. Pareto, the elite renews itself through a process of “circulation,” where older personnel make way for new members with greater energy and competence (Pareto, 1990, pp. 70–73). However, this process is not automatic—it requires institutionally established rules that ensure the objectivity and transparency of selection. M. Weber emphasized that the professionalization of the civil service and the formation of a rational bureaucracy are fundamental conditions for the stable functioning of the elite (Weber, 1991, pp. 81–84).

Contemporary researchers link the effectiveness of personnel policy to principles of meritocracy, openness, and accountability. The meritocratic approach assumes that career advancement is based on professional achievements and performance results, rather than political loyalty (Huntington, 2003, pp. 91–94). In practice, however, personnel policy often encounters the influence of informal factors—political connections, corporate interests, and regional priorities (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 102–106). This creates a risk of deforming the state administration system and undermining public trust in institutions.

Personnel policy takes on particular importance in transitional societies, where institutional reforms are underway and a new model of governance is being formed. In these conditions, it is crucial to balance the preservation of administrative experience with the renewal of personnel (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 115–118). In Azerbaijan, for example, state personnel policy aims to form a professional, responsible, and ethically stable elite capable of implementing the strategic goals of modernization. To achieve this, personnel reserves are created, evaluation and certification mechanisms for civil servants are improved, and professional development programs are introduced.

The functioning of the administrative-political elite within the state personnel policy system is determined by the combination of its structural, institutional, and moral-ethical characteristics. Among the main traits that define the elite's effectiveness are professionalism, managerial competence, political responsibility, and commitment to the principles of civil service (Mosca, 2001, pp. 46–49). The elite group plays a key role in developing and implementing strategic decisions, ensuring the continuity of power and the stability of state institutions.

A notable feature of the modern administrative-political elite is its complex hierarchical structure. It includes the top political layer, heads of ministries and agencies, regional elites, and middle-level managerial personnel (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 55–59). This structure allows for maintaining the functional integrity of the state apparatus but also creates certain challenges—limited horizontal mobility and weak personnel rotation. This leads to stagnation within management structures and a reduction in innovative potential (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 64–68).

One of the main problems in the functioning of the administrative-political elite is the imbalance between professionalism and political loyalty. In some cases, personnel policy is based not on competencies but on affiliation with specific political or corporate groups, which reduces the effectiveness of decision-making (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 76–79). Additionally, there is a persistent trend toward bureaucratization and centralization of power, which limits initiative and reduces management flexibility (Huntington, 2003, pp. 85–88). Insufficient transparency in appointment and promotion procedures also creates risks of corruption and undermines public trust in civil service institutions (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 93–96).

At the same time, positive trends are also observed in the modernization of personnel policy. The introduction of meritocratic principles, open competitions, competency assessment systems, and professional development programs contributes to the formation of a more qualified and responsible elite (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 102–105). In post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, institutional reforms are being implemented to enhance the transparency of personnel procedures and strengthen principles of accountability within the civil service (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 111–114).

The prospects for developing the administrative-political elite are linked to the further institutionalization of personnel processes, the adoption of digital management technologies, and the cultivation of a culture of professional ethics. In the long term, these measures will improve the quality of managerial decisions, strengthen citizens' trust in government, and create a sustainable model of professional state administration (Pareto, 1990, pp. 120–123).

Contemporary reforms in public administration are accompanied by the introduction of innovative approaches to personnel policy, which significantly affect the functioning of the administrative-political elite. These trends reflect a shift from traditional bureaucratic management models toward more flexible, technology-driven, and results-oriented systems (Weber, 1991, pp. 45–48). In an era of globalization and digitalization, the effectiveness of state personnel policy largely depends on the elite's ability to adapt to change and leverage innovative tools to improve governance quality (Mosca, 2001, pp. 52–55).

One of the key trends is the digitalization of personnel processes. The introduction of electronic databases, performance monitoring systems, and online platforms for training and personnel reserves significantly enhances the transparency and objectivity of staffing decisions (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 60–63). Digital technologies make it possible to create a so-called “competency elite,” where priority is given to knowledge, professional skills, and analytical abilities rather than merely political loyalty (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 68–71).

Another important trend is the development of the concept of continuous professional learning. In today's environment, civil servants and managers are required to regularly update their knowledge and master methods of strategic planning, project management, and digital administration. Institutions for professional development and state service academies have emerged as instruments for the ongoing renewal of the elite (Huntington, 2003, pp. 77–80).

This approach strengthens meritocratic principles and fosters a professional culture in public administration.

Ethical standards and a culture of accountability also gain special significance. Modern personnel policy aims to cultivate a morally responsible elite oriented toward serving society rather than satisfying corporate interests (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 86–89).

This is reflected in the strengthening of anti-corruption measures, the introduction of codes of conduct, and public oversight institutions that build citizens' trust in government (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 95–98).

In the context of Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet states, innovations in personnel policy include the introduction of competitive selection mechanisms, digital job portals, performance assessment systems, and transparent attestation procedures (Aliyev, 2020, pp. 103–107).

These measures aim to enhance the professionalism of managers and gradually renew the elite composition of the state apparatus.

The conducted study analyzed the theoretical, methodological, and practical aspects of the functioning of the administrative-political elite and its role in state personnel policy. The research showed that the administrative-political elite is a key factor in the stability of public administration, ensuring the formation of strategic decisions, the coordination of government bodies, and the continuity of institutional structures (Mosca, 2001, pp. 45–50).

Its essence is expressed in the combination of professionalism, managerial competence, and strategic planning skills, enabling it to effectively implement personnel policy objectives (Pareto, 1990, pp. 52–55).

An analysis of the elite's structure revealed that it is multi-tiered and hierarchically organized: the top political layer, heads of state bodies, and regional and municipal managers form a system that ensures the stability and integrity of the state apparatus (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 63–66).

A crucial feature is the elite's ability to reproduce itself through recruitment and rotation mechanisms, combining continuity of experience with the inclusion of new competent managers (Afanasyev, 2018, pp. 71–74). In practice, the effectiveness of the elite depends on the balance between meritocratic and patronage-based selection principles, the transparency of procedures, and adherence to ethical standards (Huntington, 2003, pp. 80–83; Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 91–94).

Research on state personnel policy has shown that it functions not only as a tool for managing human resources but also as a strategic mechanism for shaping and strengthening the administrative-political elite. Personnel policy ensures the selection, promotion, and evaluation of civil servants, stimulates professional development, and establishes the normative-legal and ethical foundations of public service (Solovyov, 2016, pp. 92–97).

Effective personnel policy combines principles of openness, transparency, meritocracy, and accountability, which increases citizens' trust in state institutions and reinforces the legitimacy of the elite (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 127–130).

Conclusion

Modern trends and innovations in personnel policy—such as digitalization, the introduction of monitoring and competency assessment systems, the development of continuous professional training, and the strengthening of ethical standards—have a significant impact on the functioning of the elite (Gerasimov, 2017, pp. 60–63; Weber, 1991, pp. 45–48).

These measures contribute to the formation of a “competence elite” capable of quickly adapting to changes in the external environment, improving the quality of decision-making, and promoting the renewal of the personnel composition. In post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, innovations in personnel policy gradually reduce the influence of patronage, enhancing the professionalism and responsibility of civil servants (Aliyev, 2018, pp. 115–118).

References

1. Afanasyev, V. G. (2018). *Administrativno-politicheskaya elita: Struktura, funktsii i problemy formirovaniya* [Administrative-political elite: Structure, functions, and problems of formation]. Nauka.
2. Aliyev, P. G. (2020). *Gosudarstvennaya kadrovaya politika v postsovetskikh stranakh: Teoriya i praktika* [State personnel policy in post-Soviet countries: Theory and practice]. Azerbaijan State University.
3. Bourdieu, P. (2005). *Sotsial'nyy kapital i vlast' elity* [Social capital and elite power]. Progress.
4. Gerasimov, A. P. (2017). *Elita i kadrovaya politika: Institutsional'nyy analiz* [Elite and personnel policy: An institutional analysis].
5. Huntington, S. P. (2003). *Politicheskiiy poryadok v menyayushchikhsya obshchestvakh* [Political order in changing societies]. Aspekt Press.
6. Kara-Murza, S. G. (2015). *Sovremennaya administrativnaya elita: Teoriya i praktika* [Modern administrative elite: Theory and practice]. RGGU.
7. Michels, R. (1987). *Oligarkhiya i «zheleznyy zakon» v politicheskikh organizatsiyakh* [Oligarchy and the “iron law” of political organizations]. Politizdat.
8. Mosca, G. (2001). *Elita i vlast'* [The ruling class]. Respublika.
9. Pareto, V. (1990). *Teoriya elit* [The theory of elites]. Progress.
10. Schmitter, P. C. (2008). *Politicheskiiy instituty i podotchyotnost' elity* [Political institutions and elite accountability]. INION.
11. Solovyov, N. I. (2016). *Kadrovaya politika i administrativno-politicheskaya elita* [Personnel policy and the administrative-political elite]. SPbGU.
12. Weber, M. (1991). *Ekonomika i obshchestvo: Ocherki sotsiologii prava, ekonomiki i vlasti* [Economy and society: Essays in the sociology of law, economy, and power]. Mysl'.

Received: 02.09.2025

Accepted: 13.12.2025