

TARİX ELMLƏRİNDƏ MÜASİR TƏLƏBLƏR VƏ TƏDQİQATLAR

II BEYNƏLXALQ ELMİ KONFRANS

Qədim Diyar

Beynəlxalq Elmi Jurnalının

XÜSUSİ BURAXILIŞI

MODERN REQUIREMENTS AND RESEARCH IN HISTORICAL SCIENCES

II INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

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Ancient Land

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Bakı, Azərbaycan
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The Change in the Administrative Affiliation of Zangezur Uyezd (District) in 1920: Historical-Geographical Context and Political-Legal Preconditions

Birja Bayramova 

Keywords: *administrative affiliation of Zangezur, territorial transformation, Zangezur Uyezd, Elisabethpol Governorate, Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920*

Açar sözlər: *Zəngəzurun inzibati mənsubiyyəti, ərazi dəyişikliyi, Zəngəzur qəzası, Yelizavetpol quberniyası, Sovet Azərbaycanı, 1920*

The administrative affiliation of Zangezur became one of the significant territorial and political issues in the South Caucasus in the early twentieth century. The developments of the 1920 marked a particularly important stage in this process, as the establishment of Soviet rule brought substantial changes to the political and administrative structure of the region. However, the change in Zangezur's administrative affiliation cannot be examined separately from its historical-geographical position and the political and military developments of the preceding decades. Therefore, an analysis of the events of 1920 requires consideration of both the earlier administrative structure of Zangezur Uyezd and political and legal circumstances that shaped its subsequent status.

In 1868, the Elisabethpol Governorate was established. Within the governorate, Zangezur Uyezd(district), characterized by its predominantly mountainous terrain, was administratively divided into four mahals: Meghri, Kapan (Qapan), Zangezur (Gorus), and Sisyan (Karakilisa). (Əhmədli, 2021, p. 4) These administrative-territorial characteristics provide an important historical and geographical framework for understanding the demographic and political processes that subsequently developed in Zangezur.

In the 1880s, Zangezur Uyezd was administratively divided into three sections: Meghri, Zangezur, and Sisian. In terms of judicial administration, the Uyezd was divided into justice-of-the-peace districts: Zangezur and Meghri. Having examined the issue from a historiographical perspective, the authors note that in 1886 the total area of Zangezur Uyezd of the Elisabethpol Governorate was 6, 829.7 thousand square versts. (Tarix və müasirlik, 2025, pp. 49-52) Authors also argue according to the Caucasian Calendar, “in 1890, the uyezd was divided into four police districts. In Karakilisa, which covered an area 2,050.1km², there were 52 villages united into 15 rural communities; in the Digh district, covering 2,407.46km², there were 76 villages united into 22 rural communities; and in Arsevanik, which covered an area of 1,230.52km², there were 109 villages united 19 rural communities” (Tarix və müasirlik, 2025, pp. 49-52).

Following the Treaty of Turkmenchay, the settlement of Armenians in the South Caucasus gradually led to the displacement of Azerbaijanis from their native lands. Their primary aim was to remove Western Azerbaijanis from the region and bring about administrative, political, and cultural changes. Overall, during the periods of 1905-1906 and 1918-1920, numerous villages by Azerbaijanis were devastated (Tarix və müasirlik, 2025, p. 7). In the early twentieth century, more specifically in May 1905, Armenians started to organize another

act of provocation against the Azerbaijani population. One of the episodes of violence associated with these events occurred in Zangezur Uyezd (district). The incident entered the historical record as the “Qatar Tragedy”. The designation derives from the fact that the massacre took place in July 1906 in the village of Qatar, located in Zangezur Uyezd (Gapan district). Residents of several nearby villages, “including Khalaj, Saldashi, Injavar, and Dashnov, had sought refuge in this village” (Bayramov, 2012, pp. 167). For nearly two weeks, Armenian forces, with the support of Russian Cossacks, subjected the village of Qatar to extensive destruction (Bayramov, 2012, p. 167).

The White Movement remained one of the major threats in the Caucasus region throughout the Civil War following the establishment of the ADR. A proponent of the idea of the united and invisible Russia and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, Lieutenant General Denikin strongly opposed the independence of the former imperial borderlands. (Abdullayev..., 2018, p. 82). The events of 1905-1906 constituted an important stage in the escalation of interethnic tensions in Zangezur. A new and more intensive phase of political and military confrontation emerged after the collapse of the Russian Empire and establishment of independent republics in the South Caucasus in 1918.

Bayramov emphasizes, “in the report No 3.dated 12 September 1918, the head of Zangezur Uyezd indicated that, under Andranik’s command, the villages of Rut or Urud, Darabash, Aghudi, and Vaghudi had been looted, while Erikli,Shukar, Melikli, Pulkend, Shaki,Gyzyljig, Karakilsa, Ilrik,Pahlili, Darabas, Kurdlar, Sisian, and Zabazadur had been burned (Bayramov, 2012, p. 169).

During the First War, “Britain regarded Russia as an allied power and entered Azerbaijan on the basis of recognizing the region as

part of the Russian Empire. Thus, in 1918, troops under the command of General W.Thomson and L.F.Bicherakov entered Azerbaijan. However, A.I.Denikin failed to establish relations with them. Notably, a few months later, W.Thomson prohibited the formation of Russian volunteer units within the British occupation zone. (Abdullayev..., 2018, p. 82)

Against this broader geopolitical background, Zangezur became one of the principal areas in which territorial claims, and military operations intersected. In December 1918, “Armenian detachments burned the villages of Aldara, Marzagat, Tughut in the Meghri region. In January 1919, twenty-one Azerbaijani villages in the Kapan (Gaphan) region were plundered, including Gushchulu, Ajili, Argez, Afsarli, Shaharchalan, Achaghuz, Okhchu, Giratagh, Bashbaki, Garabaghi, Mahmudlu, Keyddashik, Kaghachatu (Hajati), Kurut, Kachyap, Kire (Kirs), and Ajibaj. (Bayramov, 2012, p. 169)

Thus, the struggle for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity developed into an armed conflict in only one direction—in Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan (Abdullayev, 2018, p. 84). The continuation of armed confrontation and growing importance of Zangezur for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity led the ADR government to undertake military measures aimed at strengthening its position in the region.

In the autumn of 1919, a 3500 strong Zangezur detachment was formed under command of Major General A.A.Shikhlinski, Deputy Minister of War of the ADR. During the active military operations that began on 5 November 1919, villages such as Khaznavur, and Bayandur became areas of intense fighting. Ultimately, both sides returned to the previous status quo. (Abdullayev..., 2018, p. 84)

According to the Caucasian report, Zangezur Uyezd, which covered an area of 7,827.38km², also contained six obas that did

not belong to any of its 75 rural communities, comprising 326 villages. After the administration of the Elisapethpol Governorate completed the new grouping of villages between 1909 and 1920, Zangezur Uyezd had area of 6, 742.92 square versts (AXC,2014, p.46), second only to Elisabethpol Uyezd (8,624 square versts) in terms of territorial extent within the governorate, and was divided into six police districts. (Tarix və Müasirlik, 2025, p. 52)

Following the collapse of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Armenian efforts to separate Zangezur Uyezd from Azerbaijan intensified. (AXC, 2014, p. 462). The political situation changed fundamentally in 1920 with the collapse of the ADR and the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. Haji Narimonoglu notes: “On 19 January 1920, Armenian regular forces, using artillery and heavy weapons, razed another 15 villages in Zangezur to the ground”. (Nərimanoğlu, 2018, p. 181)

Thus, in the 1920s, Zangezur, where Azerbaijanis constituted more than 70 percent of the population, was Armenianized, divided into two parts, and annexed to Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan’s territorial connection with Nakhchivan was severed. (Azizova..., 2024, p. 24)

An analysis of the sources indicates that the political and military developments in Zangezur in the early twentieth century had a profound impact on the region’s socio-economic life, resulting in the destruction of settlements and the displacement of the population. Soviet- era sources particularly emphasize Zangezur’s economic ties with Azerbaijan, especially its labor and economic relations with Baku. The sources also highlight the economic links between Zangezur and the lowland areas, as well as the important role of the pasture (yaylag) system in the economic life of the local population. Following the establishment of Soviet rule in 1920, the return of the refugees,

the resolution of land issues, and establishment of a new administrative and political system in the region emerged as key priorities. Taken together, these demonstrate that Zangezur during this period was not merely an arena of military and political confrontation, but also an important region undergoing complex social, economic, and administrative transformations. (Dokumenti i materiali, 1989, pp. 35-43)

Solmaz Maharramova takes note, “in 1920, Soviet Azerbaijan issued an ultimatum to Armenia, declaring Karabakh and Zangezur integral parts of Armenian forces from these territories. Failure to comply would be regarded as grounds for war. (Maharramova, 2025, p. 64) The contrast between Soviet Azerbaijan’s earlier position on Zangezur and the decisions adopted toward the end of 1920 is particularly significant for understanding the transformation of the region’s political status.

The Protocol of the Joint Meeting of the Political Bureau and the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolsheviks), held on 30 November 1920, provides important evidence regarding the political status of Zangezur at the end of 1920. The protocol stated that there were no borders between Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia and, at the same time, included a separate provision stipulating that Zangezur would pass to Armenia. The same decision also provided for granting the mountainous part of Karabakh the right to self- determination and establishing a military and economic alliance between the two Soviet republics. (Dokumenti i materiali, 1989, p. 44)

The analysis demonstrates that the change in Zangezur’s administrative affiliation in 1920 developed within a complex historical context shaped by administrative, socio-economic, demographic, and military-political processes. The establishment of Soviet rule marked a turning point: while

Azerbaijan initially declared Karabakh and Zangezur integral parts of Azerbaijan, the protocol of 30 November 1920 contained a provision stating that Zangezur would pass to Armenia. This shift reflects the rapidly changing political environment created by the Sovietization of the South Caucasus. Thus, the study examines the transformation of Zangezur's status not as an isolated decision, but within the broader historical-geographical and political context of the period.

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Nizami və antik dövr Azərbaycan tarixinin bəzi məsələlərinə tənqidi baxış

Nizami Zeynalov 

Açar sözlər: Nizami Gəncəvi, İsgəndərnamə, Qafqaz Albaniyası, Makedoniyalı İsgəndər, Dərbənd, Nüşabə

Keywords: Nizami Ganjavi, Iskendername, Caucasian Albania, Alexander the Great, Derbent, Nushaba

Nizami yaradıcılığı, böyük şairin zəngin bədii irsi uzun illərdən bəri tədqiq olunmasına baxmayaraq bu gün də öz aktuallığını itirməmişdir. Nəzərə almaq lazımdır ki, tarixi gerçəkliyə müraciət, tarixi hadisələrdən və personajlardan istifadə olunması bir çox klassiklərlə müqayisədə Nizami Gəncəvi yaradıcılığında daha zəngindir. Bu mənada Nizami Gəncəvinin “Xəmsə”sinə daxil olan “İskəndərnamə” poeması müstəsna əhəmiyyət kəsb edir. Şübhəsiz, Nizami Gəncəvi bu poemanı yazarkən öz dövrü üçün Şərq aləminə məlum olan tarixi mənbələri diqqətlə araşdırmış, Makedoniyalı İskəndərin tarixini əks etdirən əsərlərə müraciət etmiş, eyni zamanda böyük fəth haqqında Şərqdə dolaşan rəvayətləri, nağılları - bir sözlə, şifahi xalq yaradıcılığını da gözədən keçirmişdir. Dahi mütəfəkkirin “İskəndərnamə” poemasında vətənimizin antik dövrü ilə bağlı maraq doğuran məqamlar sırasına “Makedoniyalı İskəndərin Azərbaycana gəlişi”, “Bərdə hökmdarı Nüşabə ilə görüşməsi”, “Dərbənd şəhərinin ələ keçirilməsi” və “Dərbənd səddinin möhkəmləndirilməsi” ilə bağlı məqamları aid etmək olar (Gəncəvi, 2011, s. 197-215, 224-231).

Əlbəttə, “İskəndərnamə” poemasında qeyd olunan bu məqamların heç biri ciddi mənbəşünaslıq bazasına əsaslanmır və birmənalı olaraq şairin yaradıcı təxəyyülünün nəticəsi kimi qəbul edilməlidir.

Lakin təəssüflə qeyd edilməlidir ki, son dövrlərdə vətən tarixşünaslığında Nizami Gəncəvinin “İskəndərnamə” poemasının motivlərinə istinad edən və tarixi reallığı olduğu kimi əks etdirməyən, Azərbaycanın antik tarixi ilə bağlı bir çox məqamları təhrif edən əsərlər meydana çıxmaqdadır. Bir çox vətən tədqiqatçıları məhz “İskəndərnamə” poemasına istinad edərək Makedoniyalı İskəndərin “Azərbaycana gəlişi” onun “Alban-Arrana” və “Şirvana gəlişi” kimi, “Bərdə hökmdarı Nüşabə ilə görüşü”nu amazonlarla görüşü kimi təfsir etmişlər (Atəşi, 2011; Əsədov, 2011; Xalisbəyli, 1991; Qabıssanlı, 2013; Gasanov, 2017).

Makedoniyalı İskəndərin “Azərbaycana gəlişi” məsələsinə toxunarkən qeyd etmək lazımdır ki, bu, heç bir ciddi mənbə ilə təsdiq olunmur. Birmənalı şəkildə qeyd etmək istərdik ki, böyük fatehin ayağı nəinki Azərbaycanın şimalına, bəzi tədqiqatçıların qeyd etdiyi kimi “Albaniya-Arran” ərazilərinə, heç Azərbaycanın cənubuna – Atropatenaya da dəyməmişdir. Azərbaycanın antik dövr hökmdarlarının “Makedoniyalı İskəndərlə görüşü” məsələsinə gəlincə isə qeyd etmək lazımdır ki, biliklərimizin hazırkı səviyyəsində həmin dövrdə Azərbaycanın şimalında – Albaniyada hansı hökmdarın hakimiyyətdə olması, onun böyük fatehlə hansı münasibətlərdə olması haqqında əlimizdə heç bir mənbə məlumatı yoxdur. Atropatın İskəndərlə görüşərək ona “100 amazin qadını bağışlaması” haqqında məlumat isə, ehtimal ki, əfsanəvi məlumatların təsiri altında meydana gəlmişdir. Çünki Makedoniyalı İskəndərin real tarixini yazan Flavi Arrian özü də bu məlumata şübhə ilə yanaşır və bunun Laq oğlu Ptolemey və

Aristobul tərəfindən təsdiq edilmədiyini yazır (Arr., Anab., VII, 13, 2-3).

Bəzi tədqiqatçılar Nizami Gəncəvinin “İskəndərnamə”sində “Bərdə hökmdarı Nüşabənin İskəndərlə görüşü”nü böyük fəhmin amazonlarla görüşü, daha dəqiq desək amazon qadın hökmdarı Falestris/Talestrislə görüşü kimi irəli sürürlər (Atəşi, 2011, s. 40-41; Qasanov, 2017, s. 166-167). Məhz bu hadisənin motivləri əsasında Makedoniyalı İskəndər “Azərbaycana gətirilir”. Lakin hesab edirik ki, bu hadisə də heç bir ciddi mənbəşünaslıq məlumatına əsaslanmır. Hələ antik müəlliflərə məlum idi ki, “böyük fəhmin amazonlarla görüşü” Onesikritin şişirdilmiş məlumatına əsaslanır (Plut., Alex., XLVI,1). Bu məlumata tənqidi yanaşmadan antik müəlliflərdən Siciliyalı Diodor və Kursi Ruf onu öz əsərlərində olduğu kimi vermişlər (Diod., XVII, 77, 1-3; Curt., VI, 5, 24). Flavi Arrian və onun mənbələri isə “böyük fəhmin amazonlarla görüşü”nü təsdiq etmir.

Nizami Gəncəvinin “İskəndərnamə” poeması əsasında Makedoniyalı İskəndərin “Dərbəndə tərəf hərəkət etməsi”, “Dərbənd keçidində sədd çəkdirməsi”, “Dərbənd qapılarını möhkəmləndirməsi”, bir sözlə böyük fəhmin Qafqazda olması haqqındakı məlumatlar da, əlbəttə ki, real tarixi ənənə ilə bağlı deyil. Məsələ burasındadır ki, Makedoniyalı İskəndərin real tarixini yazan Flavi Arrian antik coğrafiyada Parapamis dağları adlandırılan, əslində isə müasir coğrafi anlamda Hindiquş dağ silsiləsi ilə eyniləşdirilən dağları nəzərdə tutmuş, İskəndərin Baktriyada məhz bu dağlardan keçməsi barədə məlumat vermişdir. Makedoniyalı İskəndərin yürüşlərini antik qaynaqlar əsasında ciddi şəkildə araşdıran əksər tədqiqatçılar da bu qənaətdədirlər (Rtveladze, 2019, s. 21-22; For, 2011, s. 75; Şaxrmayr, 1997, s. 286; Şifman, 1988, s. 125; Bosworth, 1996, s. 118; Tarn, 1948, s. 66).

Beləliklə, Nizami Gəncəvinin “İskəndərnamə” poemasının bəzi motivlərinin araşdırılması göstərir ki, dahi mütəfəkkir öz dövrünədək mövcud olan bir sıra qaynaqlardan, şifahi xalq yaradıcılığından, tarixi rəvayət və əfsanələrdən istifadə edərək böyük bir söz xəzinəsi yaratmışdır. Şair bu sənət əsərini yaratmaq üçün qarşısına qoyduğu məqsədlərə nail olmuşdur. Lakin böyük mütəfəkkirin bu əsərinə istinad etməklə təsvir edilən dövrün tarixi reallıqlarını tənqidi münasibət bəsləmədən qəbul etmək, əlbəttə ki, yolverilməzdir. Bu mənada Nizami Gəncəvi yaradıcılığının tarixi motivlərindən bəhrələnərkən, şairin əsərlərindəki tarixi hadisə və prosesləri şərh edərkən, onlara tənqidi yanaşmaq, dövrün tarixi məxəzləri ilə müqayisəli şəkildə tutuşdurmaq və obyektiv tarixi nöqtəyi-nəzərdən qiymətləndirmək lazımdır.

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Issues in the Study of 19th-Century Iranian History in Azerbaijani Historiography

Farah Karimova 

Keywords: *Azerbaijan, Iranian historiography, Qajar era, Azerbaijan national press, modernization, Iranian studies school, Soviet-era scholarship, Russo-Iran wars, South Azerbaijan, independence*

Açar sözlər: *Azərbaycan, İran tarixşünaslığı, Qacarlar dövrü, Azərbaycanın milli mətbuatı, modernləşmə, İranşünaslıq məktəbi, sovet dövrü tədqiqatları, Rusiya–İran müharibələri, Cənubi Azərbaycan, müstəqillik*

As is well known, Azerbaijan and Iran have shared centuries of common historical, political, economic, and cultural relations. Historically, the territory known as Iran was incorporated into states established and governed by various Turkic dynasties. Until the early twentieth century, Iran was not modern nation-state as it is constituted and understood today; rather, the territories historically associated with Iran constituted a historical-geographical and cultural-political space that at different periods, formed part of states established and ruled by Turkic dynasties. It was only after the Pahlavi dynasty came to power (1925–1979), particularly from the 1930s, the concept of “Iran” became increasingly associated with a state-sponsored conception of national identity centered on Persian historical and cultural heritage; in 1935, the country officially adopted “Iran” as its name in international usage.

In Azerbaijan, the history of Iran from the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century was largely studied within the framework of research devoted to the history of Azerbaijan during the same period, and there were published numerous monographs, dissertations, articles on various aspects of Iran's history. Accordingly, in Azerbaijan, the history of Iran from the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century was largely studied within the framework of research devoted to the history of Azerbaijan during the same period, and there were published numerous monographs, dissertations, articles on various aspects of Iran's history.

As is well known, Iran was under the rule of the Qajar dynasty throughout the nineteenth century (1796–1925). Marked by significant political, socio-economic, and administrative transformations, this period constitutes an important stage in the history of Iran. In Azerbaijani historiography, the Qajar era has been the most extensively researched period of Iranian history, with studies that primarily focused on Iran's political history and foreign policy, the Russo-Iranian Wars, the Qajar system of governance, prominent statesmen and political figures, socio-economic relations, modernization reforms, various social and political movements, and issues relating to South Azerbaijan. Chronologically, scholarship on these subjects may be divided into three categories: 1. Early scholarly works produced by Azerbaijani scholars and intellectuals during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, together with articles and other writings on Iran published in the periodical press; 2. Systematic research works produced during the Soviet period; 3. Scholarly works published during the period of independence.

The formation of academic research on Iranian history within Azerbaijani historical scholarship can be traced back to the early nineteenth century and is tied to Abbasgulu Aga Bakikhanoff (1794–1847), a founding figure of Azerbaijani historiography.

The scholarly study of both Azerbaijani history and, in parallel, Iranian history began with A.Bakikhanoff's "Gulistani-Iram", which provided the first historical narrative spanning from old times to the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813.

Written in Persian on the basis of Arabic and Persian sources, as well as the works of ancient Greco-Roman authors, "Gulistani-Iram" consists of a preface and five chapters. The first three chapters deal with the history of the Shirvanshah state, Dagestan, and events that took place in Shirvan. Chapter IV covers the period from the establishment of the Safavid state to the end of the reign of Nader Shah Afshar; and Chapter V examines events from Nader Shah's death to the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. It should be noted that some of the information provided by A.Bakikhan off is not based on historically evidence and carry a legendary character.

Another one of the early 19th-century research works was the study entitled "Bab and the Babis: Religious and Political Upheavals in Iran in 1848–1852" by Mirza Kazem-Beg (1802–1870), an enlightener-democrat and Orientalist scholar known as the "father of Russian Oriental studies". His work devoted to the Babi movement that took place in Iran in 1848–1852, and was a popular uprising directed against feudalism, the arbitrary rule of the higher clergy, and the growing political and economic intervention of foreign powers. This work is the first historiographical study of the Babi movement in Azerbaijani historical science, and Mirza Kazem-Beg may be regarded as the movement's first historiographer. It analyzes the nature and socio-philosophical dimensions of the Babi movement, its causes, progression, and key figures, also examines Islamic ideology, its historical emergence and spread, and various sects and schools of Islam.

In addition, various aspects of different periods of Iranian history, including the history of nineteenth-century Iran, were examined in "Letters of Kamal ud-Dowleh" by Mirza Fatali Akhundoff (1812–1878), a prominent nineteenth-century Azerbaijani public enlightener, philosopher, and playwright, as well as in the Sayehatnameh (Travelogues) of Haji Zeynalabdin Shirvani (1779–1837), a geographer, traveler, historian, and ethnographer of 19th century.

As is well known, the publication of the newspaper "*Akinchi*" in 1875 marked the founding of Azerbaijan's national press. Subsequently, in newspapers and periodicals such as "*Akinchi*" (1875–1877), "*Ziya*", "*Keshkul*" (1883–1891), and "*Kaspi*" (1881–1919), began to periodically publish articles on different themes concerning Iran by various authors. Following the Russian Revolution of 1905, the further development of the Azerbaijani press and the emergence of new newspapers and journals such as "*Hayat*", "*Irshad*", "*Fuyuzat*", "*Molla Nasraddin*", "*Taraqqi*", and "*Achiq Soz*", the Iranian theme began to receive extensive coverage in the press, and as a result, there were published numerous materials concerning Iran's socio-political condition at that period.

The beginning of the twentieth century may be regarded as an important stage in the development of Iranian historiography in Azerbaijan. Following the declaration of Azerbaijani independence and the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918, issues relating to Iran began to be approached within the framework of state policy. From the beginning of the twentieth century, there were conducted foundational scientific investigations into various aspects of Iranian history by prominent figures such as Mammed Amin Rasulzade, Ahmad bey Aghaoghlu, and Mohammad Agha Shahtakhtinski, and the findings and results of these investigations were disseminated primarily through the pages of

newspapers and periodicals. Notably, M.A.Rasulzade published "Turks of Iran" in 1912, a collection of articles previously published in the Istanbul-based journals "Turk yurdu" and "Sebil-ur-reshad". This work examined socio-political processes in Iran from antiquity to the early twentieth century, the condition of Turkic communities in Iran, the role of Iranian Turks in the country's socio-political life, and the threats of assimilation they faced. Must be noted that shortly before this period, M.A.Rasulzadeh had lived in Tehran from 1909 to 1911, where he served as editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Iran-e Now" in Persian language, and closely involved in Iran's socio-political life. Overall, during this period, Azerbaijani intellectuals not only wrote on Iranian affairs, but also in many cases actively participated in the socio-political processes.

In subsequent years, Ahmad Bey Aghaoghlu's works, such as "Iran Between 1500 and 1900" (published in 1934), also released under the title "Iran and Its Revolution" (published in 1941) played a significant role in the study of 19th-century Iranian history. Covering the history of Iran from the Safavid period to the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), A.Aghaoghlu examines periods of rule of Turkic dynasties such as the Safavids, Afshars, and Qajars, and the socio-political processes of those periods, also analyzes Safavid religious policy, Anglo-Russian rivalry for dominance in Iran, concessions granted to foreign capital by Qajar monarchs across various sectors, the political and economic conditions of Iran during the reigns of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (1848–1896) and Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar (1896–1907).

The systematic study of Iranian history and the production of academic research in Azerbaijan are closely associated with Soviet Azerbaijani historiography. Despite the political and ideological constraints imposed on scholarly research during this period, such as Marxist-Leninist ideology and the principle

of class struggle defined by the Soviet regime, Azerbaijani Iranian studies developed rapidly. It was during this period that Iranian studies school took shape, and a number of prominent Iranianist scholars emerged, including Shahin Ibrahimoff, Shovkat Tagiyeva, Ogtay Melikoff, Abudlhuseyn Agahi, Hidayat Hatami, Zaker Abdullayev, Ahmad Aminzadeh, Raufbeg Seyidoff, Mashallah Rabizadeh, Ali Shamida, and others, who made significant contributions to the development of Iranian studies.

One of the principal directions in the study of 19th-century Iranian history was the examination of Iran's socio-economic relations, particularly centered on South Azerbaijan. In this field, the prominent Iranian studies scholars - Sh.Taghiyeva, through such monographs as "An Outline of the History of South Azerbaijan (1828–1917)" (co-authored with Z.Abdullayev and Sh.Ibrahimoff), "Forms of Land Ownership and Land-Use Regulations in Iran in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," and "The Condition of Iranian Peasants in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries", as well as R.Seyidoff in his work "The Iranian Bourgeoisie in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries", extensively analyzed agrarian relations in Iran, forms of land ownership, taxes and obligations, the economic policies of the Qajar government, peasant-feodal relations and the condition of the peasantry, the development of crafts and trade, and the formation of the Iranian bourgeoisie.

Other subjects in Soviet historiography in the study of nineteenth-century Iranian history were the history of Iran's social and political thought, its foreign policy, and relations with European powers. In this field, there were published scholarly works including A.Agahi's "From the History of Social and Political Thought in Iran (Second Half of the 17th Century – First Quarter of the 19th Century)", Sh.Ibrahimoff's "The Formation and Activity of Political Societies and Organizations

in Iran (1858–1906)", Rovshan Aslanoff's "Iranian-Turkish Relations in the 1820s–1860s," and Nikolai Tikhonoff's "Ten Years of Effective Cooperation: On Soviet-Iranian Relations"

After Azerbaijan gained state independence in 1991, a new stage began in the study of national history, as well as the history of Iran. This period yielded new conceptual approaches to historical subjects, there was conducted more objective research free from ideological constraints. New studies were produced on such topics as Qajar rule and its place and role in Iranian history, the domestic and foreign policies of the Qajar government, Iran's modernization, as well as the Russo-Iranian wars and the South Azerbaijan question.

Notable monographs were produced in this context, such as Tahire Salmanipur's *"Iran under Qajar Rule"*; Afshan Shafieva's *"Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh and the Modernization of Iran"*; Ramin Mahammadli's *"Diplomatic Relations between Qajar Iran and the Russian Empire in the Early Nineteenth Century (Based on Persian-Language Sources)"*; Habib Shirazer's *"The Russo-Iranian Wars during the Qajar Period (Based on Persian-Language Sources)"*; and Karim Shukuroff's *"Turkmenchay—1828: A Historical Chronicle"* and others. In addition, a number of studies including Gismat Davudoff's *"Iran–Russia Relations in the First Three Decades of the Nineteenth Century in Iranian Historiography"*; Nushabe Babayeva's *"From the History of Socio-Political Thought in South Azerbaijan (Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century – Early Twentieth Century)"*; and *"An Outline History of South Azerbaijan (1828–1917)"* (co-authored by Samed Scheherazade and Akram Bijeh), and others devoted specifically to the historiography of the Russo-Iranian wars and socio-political developments.

Furthermore, Vidadi Mustafayev, one of modern Azerbaijan's leading scholars of Iranian Studies, has conducted extensive research on various aspects of Iran's 19th-20th centuries history, and its contemporary history, as well as on the study of Southern Azerbaijan and the national consciousness of Southern Azerbaijanis. In this field he publicated numerous works such as "*Certain Aspects of the Concept of Nation in Iranian Social Thought (Late 19th and the First Half of the 20th Century)*"; "*The Iranian (Azerbaijani) Army in the 19th Century*"; "*The Participation of Azerbaijanis in Iran's Administrative System in the Second Half of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*", "*The Qajars and The Azerbaijanis*", "*The Role of Southern Azerbaijanis in Iran's Modernization in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*", and etc.

Thus, the study of 19th-century Iranian history in Azerbaijan dates back to the 19th century, when the country was still part of the Russian Empire, and has continued over a long historical period. During the Soviet period, an Iranian studies school was established in Azerbaijan, and despite the limitations and shortcomings of Soviet-era scholarship, it provided an important foundation for further studies in Azerbaijani Iranian studies after the country gained independence.

The Problem of Sumerian Origins and Early Turkic Migrations: Historical and Geographical Parallels

Zahra Mahmudzada 

Keywords: *Sumerian settlements, Turkic migrations, ethnic identity, linguistic identity, geographical parallels*

Açar sözlər: *Şumer yaşayış məskənləri, türk miqrasiyaları, etnik kimlik, dilçilik kimliyi, coğrafi paralellər*

The issue of origin and migration has always been one of the most debated issues in the study of Sumerians and Turks. The origins of the Sumerians and the manner of their emergence in the region hold significant importance for anyone researching the history of ancient Mesopotamia. This thesis examines this issue within the context of early Turkic migrations, with attention to historical and geographical parallels. Migrations give rise to new social relations and new cultural developments among different societies. Therefore, examining the question of Sumerians' origins within the context of migration and historical-geography offers greater insight into these phenomena. Perhaps after reading this study, you will not be able to find a complete answer to your question, but you will think about the issue from a different perspective. This study does not propose a direct ethnic and linguistic identity between the Sumerians and the early Turks, but is based on a comparative and historical geographical approach, focusing on parallels in the processes of cultural formation.

It examines substrate populations, language contact theories, and migration as a means of cultural diffusion. This thesis claims that both Sumerian civilization and early Turkic culture emerged through mutual contact with pre-existing cultural environments.

Mehmet Mandaloglu noted in his research that a large portion of the migrations originated from the interior of Asia, and the region from which these migrations took place is Central Asia, which is considered the Turkic homeland (Mandaloglu, 2011, p. 32). He also referred to Sumerologist Kramer and noted that the Sumerians were closely related to the city-state of Aratta, based on Kramer's Lugalbanda and Enmerkar epics, and that their homeland may have been in the territory of Aratta (Mandaloglu, 2011, p. 34).

Kramer's book *The Sumerians* states that the oldest layers of Mesopotamia are still inaccessible to archaeological research due to geological reasons, soil subsidence, and rising water levels. And the result is that these layers are still submerged and are waiting to be explored, which takes the Sumerian area to an earlier period than 4500 BC. Kramer also researched, referring to Landsberg's work, and concluded that the first people living in this area were not Sumerians. Because the names of rivers, cities (Ur, Eredu, Larsa, etc.) and other words were words that were borrowed into the Sumerian language. Kramer called this ancient people Proto-Euphrates-Ubaid (Kramer, 1963, p. 40). This evidence shows us that Sumer had older roots and that it had formed and developed further in this new area, building on the existing culture and economy. According to Kramer "The reason traces of these earliest settlements in Sumer have not as yet been unearthed, it was argued, may be because the land has been sinking slowly at the same time that the water table has been rising. The very lowest level of cultural remains in Sumer may, therefore, now be under water...If that should prove to be

true, Sumer's oldest cultural remains are still buried and untapped, and the date of Sumer's very first settlements may have to be pushed back a millennium or so.” [Kramer, 1963, p. 40] It is also clear from this that it gives a scientific justification for the lack of sufficient archeological sources in the oldest settlements.

German Sumerologist Benno Landsberger, in an article in which he studied the origin and language of the Sumerians, spoke about the similarity of some features of the Sumerian language with the Turkish language. He showed that the most important similarity was the "complex" sentence structure and the "chaining phrase" system (Landsberger, 1943, p. 93). He actually emphasized that there were similarities with the Turkish language in some points, and then there was still a contradiction. It is possible that the Sumerian language and the Turkish language were not exactly related, but they came into contact with each other over time.

Landsberger identifies that the second characteristic is a type of sentence structure termed “complexive”, and complexive sentence structure is best exemplified in Turkic languages. (Landsberger, 1943, p. 94). According to Benno, Sumerian, like Turkish, is considered to be thought first and spoken later, and even then, it distinguishes it from the group of Semitic languages, which he calls the Italic approach, in which thought is formed during speech. He argues that similarities such as the Sumerian “e-ta” corresponding to the Turkish “ev-de” (at home) suggest a loose kinship, another piece of evidence for this loose relationship is that, in both Sumerian and Turkish, the first person is indicated by the letter 'M' and the second person by 'S'. He also noted that among the comparisons made by Hommel, the most compelling is that between the Sumerian “dingir” and the Old Turkic word “tjri”, however, it must also be taken into account that this word “dingir” might belong to one of the substrate languages of the pre-Sumerian peoples. [Landsberger, 1943, p.96] As we can see from this, although he shows the

similarity of the Sumerian language in terms of personality as a loose relationship, he still suggests the possibility that it could come from another substrate language. This is an example of Benno's scientific reserve. That is, although Benno accepts these linguistic parallels, he considers more complex models of historical language admixture.

According to Cartley Findley “the origins of the Turkic peoples are not well documented. Yet the Turks or their precursors already had a greater-than-regional role in Eurasian history before their name appears in historical sources” (Findley, Carter, 2005, p. 21). According to his research, the Saka\Scythian culture is an environment in which the Turks formed their own culture entirely on them. Evidence found in the Saka Scythian culture indicates that this cultural complex spread eastward and was later absorbed by the Turks and Mongols in the Altai region. “Whereas the Sakas, or at least their leadership, were Indo-Iranian, the same culture spread eastward, both among the Altaic peoples from whom Turks and Mongols would emerge and into northern China... Scythian military tactics, combining mobility, skill in mounted archery, and deceptive maneuvers such as ambushes and feigned retreats, set standards that remained the key to victory on the steppes until the advent of effective gunpowder weapons” (Findley, Carter, 2005, p. 25).

From here it becomes clear to us that military and political practices were created, rather than being recreated, by being transmitted across borders and cultures, and by establishing contact. “The carpet was woven with a type of knot that is now considered distinctively Turkish and is called the Gordes knot, after a town in Turkey.” (Findley, Carter, 2005, p. 26). This carpet shows that technological and artistic techniques spread before the emergence of many Turkic states. This shows us that rather than a direct ethnic continuity, this evidence points to a historical and geographical parallel in which Turkic culture

developed within an already established steppe civilization. That is, Turkic culture did not emerge in a vacuum and developed on the basis of Eurasian steppe culture.

Early Turkic migrations should not be seen as mere sudden, mass movements, but as the result of long-term mobility and political fragmentation in the Eurasian steppe. According to Golden Peter “The breakup of the Xiongnu (whose ethno-linguistic affiliations remain a matter of conjecture) produced the migrations of Oghuric-Turkic speaking peoples to the Kazakhstanian and then western Eurasian (Ponto-Caspian) steppes (4th and 5th centuries AD)” (Golden, 1992, p. 912). This process is one of the most important factors that shaped Turkic ethnogenesis. In his study, Golden Peter shows the rise of the Ashina lineage and the emergence of the Goytürk identity as a result of post-Xiongnu migration waves. “Interestingly, none of the early Turkic Qaghans bear Turkic names” (Golden, 1992, p. 912). These facts show that early Turkic culture did not emerge in a vacuum, but rather through long-term migration and cultural transmission processes.

This thesis argues that ancient societies did not emerge suddenly or in a vacuum, but rather through complex and long-term historical processes. The evidence in the Sumerian case supports the existence of earlier populations that were later assimilated by the Sumerians to form a new culture. Similarly, early Turkic migrations facilitated the transmission of political structures, military and cultural traditions, and shaped a Turkic identity within a broader civilization. The historical and geographical parallels identified in this study do not claim any direct ethnic continuity between the Sumerians and the Turks, but rather present patterns of development shaped by mobility and cultural interaction.

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Ra and Tengri: Concepts of the Supreme Deity in Ancient Egyptian and Turkic Belief System

Khayala Gasimova 

Keywords: *Tengrism, Ra, belief system, sun, civilizations*

Açar sözlər: *Tenqrizm, Ra, inanc sistemi, günəş, sivilizasiyalar*

Religious worldviews have played a special role in the history of the peoples of the world. Although the religious views of the ancient world civilizations were diverse, there were also aspects that united these religious views. Early religious beliefs, belief in the sanctity of nature, the sun, the sky, celestial bodies, and other religious worldview, have played an unparalleled role in the history of both ancient civilizations-Turkic and Egyptian for centuries, and their traces have survived to nowadays. In ancient Egypt, Ra, known as the sun god, was later identified with the god Amon and called Amon-Ra. Most Egyptian pharaohs called themselves the son of the sun. We can also find the same religious-political view in the Far East - in China. In ancient Egypt, the supreme religious power was Ra, and in ancient Turkic civilization, Tengrism. In the history of both civilizations - Ancient Egypt and Turkic civilization - there were various religious views, including the belief that the sky and its objects were sacred. Belief in Tengri, the God of the Sky, who was believed to be the main creative force in ancient Turkic society, also combined animism and shamanism, which are early Turkic religious beliefs.

A comparative analysis of these supreme beliefs allows us to discover the significance of these religious views in the history of two different civilizations.

Supreme deity in Egypt: The belief that the sun is sacred is found in the history of almost all ancient civilizations, most likely because people considered it a source of life due to the heat it received from the sun. The cult of the sun was considered sacred among the societies that inhabited ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Far East, as well as the territories of present-day Azerbaijan.

Ra was deified as one of the sun gods among the ancient Egyptians from the 3rd millennium BC. In the following millennium, the ideas about the god Amon began to form a unity with the belief in the sun god Ra, and the ancient Egyptians began to approach Amon-Ra as the main divine force (Bunyadov, 2007, p. 232). Depicted in images with a sun disk and an eagle's head, Ra was the dominant religion in Heliopolis in the first centuries of its existence, and later spread as the supreme religion throughout all of ancient Egypt.

Belief in the sun god Ra began to spread widely in ancient Egypt during the Third Dynasty, and the architect Imhotep built a magnificent temple in his honor in Heliopolis. Artifacts found in the step pyramid complex built in honor of the Egyptian king Netjerikhet (Djoser) indicate that the name of the sun god Ra was found in the form Hesira - Ra during this period (Wilkinson, 2005, pp. 253-254). The belief system in Ra, considered a supreme god superior to other ancient Egyptian gods as a creative force, also influenced the religious views of subsequent generations. The cult of Atenism, which was first introduced by Pharaoh Amenhotep IV as the first monotheistic religion in Egypt, to a society where polytheism had existed for centuries, also stemmed from the belief in Ra, the sun god. Pharaoh

Amenhotep changed his name into Akhenaten. In ancient Egypt, during the religious reforms of the fourth Akhenaten, the god Aten was depicted in the form of a sun disk in Atenism, where the influence of the sun god Amon-Ra was felt.

According to Sir Flinders Petrie, Ra became the dominant God during the Nineteenth Dynasty. He united the Theban gods, such as Amon Ra, and became the "king of the gods." The belief system in Ra as the supreme god existed in ancient Egypt for many centuries, but disappeared by the time of the emergence of early Christianity (Petrie, 1906, p. 53).

Belief in the sky God -Tengri:

In ancient Mesopotamia, as in Egypt, rulers compared themselves to the sun, even identified themselves with it. For example, Hammurabi, in the preamble to his laws, called himself the sun of Babylon, which sheds light on Sumer and Akkad (Frankfort, pp. 307-308). This suggests that the deification of the sun as the main source of power and energy and the rulers equating themselves with the sun were found not only in the ancient Egyptian civilization but also in Mesopotamia. However, among the ancient Turkic peoples, the ruler was not exactly identified with the supreme god, but was called a chosen person sent by Tengri. The inscriptions on the Orkhon-Yenisei monuments also indicate the belief in a supreme god among the Turks, and that the Turkic rulers were sent by Tengri. Such high religious beliefs, especially the belief that the sun and fire are considered sacred, have played an important role in the lives of Turkic societies, and even today, the cult of the sun and fire, which are symbols of light and life, is considered sacred in the lives of Turkic peoples. In the belief system of the ancient Turkic peoples, belief in a female deity called "Sun Mother", "Gök Ana", "Kün Ana", "Yaşık Ana" and who resided in the seventh layer of heaven also existed within the framework of Tengrism

(Gokalp, 1923, p. 146). The belief in the Sun, which has its roots mainly in the Altai-Yakut religious system, and its sacredness has survived to this day. For example, the fact that Azerbaijani Turks still swear by looking at the Sun and use expressions such as "May the Sun rise upon you" gives reason to say that these ancient motifs are still in the memory of the people.

In the Orkhon-Yenisei inscriptions, in the writings of Kultigin, Bilge Kagan, Tonyukuk and other Turkic khagans, the word "God" is more often mentioned in the form of "Tengri", "Gok Tengri". In ancient Egypt as well as in Turkish societies, throughout the history of the world's peoples, people have used various ways to show their faith in their God and his holiness. For this, people created various tamghas, signs, and symbols. 'Tamgha's also held a special place in Turkish culture, symbolizing Turkic tribes and God appeared. In ancient Turkic peoples, the seal of God was mainly in the form of a symbol known as a swastika and represented the god. Various architectural examples of Central Asian architecture contain such siwatik-like symbols. According to some researchers, these symbols are also considered to represent gods, time, the four elements, and the wheel of the universe (Aslan, Duran, pp. 1379-1382).

Research suggests that although the religious views of these two different world civilizations are different, there are also similarities between them. The existence of belief in the Sun Mother within Tengrism has similar features to the Sun cult of Ancient Egypt, with its motifs of belief in the sun as a protective force. While the Egyptian God Ra, believed to be the supreme religious power, was depicted as an eagle-headed man with a sun disk and identified with the pharaoh, within the framework of Tengrism, the Sky God was considered sacred as the creative, life giving, and protective force of the universe among the Turkic community. While Tengri, as an indescribable divine force, was

the power that gave power to the Turkic khagans, in Egypt Ra was considered directly related to the pharaoh.

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The Transformation of the Concept of 'Nation' in Post-Revolutionary Europe (1789–1870): Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

Javidan Gafarov 

Keywords: *nationalism, French Revolution, modernism, concept of nation, civic vs. ethnic nationalism, European History*

Açar sözlər: *millətçilik, Fransız İnqilabı, modernizm, millət konsepti, mülki-sivil vs. etnik millətçilik, Avropa Tarixi*

The French Revolution of 1789 was a decisive break in the historical development of European politics, as it shifted the focus of sovereignty from the dynastic to the “nation”. But the concept of the nation was not fixed, as revolutionary ideas spread throughout Central and Southern Europe. This paper explores the changes in the concept of the “nation” from 1789 to 1870 in France, Germany, and Italy. Moving beyond the classical descriptive-historical approach, the paper engages in both a modernist and socio-theoretical analysis of the concept. By examining how the civic-state model, romantic-cultural answer, and national unification movements transformed the concept of the nation from an all-embracing popular principle to a force of state centralization, this paper demonstrates how the concept of the nation changed through time with the advent of new socio-political ideas and institutions.

The re-evaluation of the 19th-century nation-building in Europe with an eye on the new theories helps to meet the modern requirements of non-essentialism analysis of collective identity building processes (Anderson, 1983).

The revolution of 1789 was a rupture in the historical development of European politics. Before it, the European state was primarily based on dynastic foundations, absolute power, and feudal divisions summed up in the phrase *l'état, c'est moi*. The revolution overthrew these principles, proclaiming in its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, article 3, that “the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation”. The phrase itself was revolutionary, as it proclaimed the “nation”, previously a vague term for a geographical or cultural community, as the new political principle.

But the meaning, boundaries, and value of the concept were far from fixed, as revolutionary ideas interacted with different local societies, each with their social structures, historical premises, and cultural specifics. Between 1789 and the completion of German and Italian unifications in 1870-1871, the nation transformed from a revolutionary and civic concept to a set of different ideological approaches to institutional building in Western, Central, and Southern Europe (Brubaker, 1996).

Investigating the transformation of the concept of “Nation” requires transcending the classical political-historical approach, which considers nations as natural, objective phenomena that have been given throughout history. Modern historical analysis, however, requires a conceptual and socio-theoretical approach (*Begriffsgeschichte*) to studying political concepts and their transformation.

To understand the transformation of the concept of the Nation in 19th-century Europe, this paper draws on the classical historiographical distinction between Modernism and

Ethnosymbolism, but ultimately relies on the current rethinking of the national idea (Gellner, 1983).

Modernism, championed by historians like Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson, views the nation as a phenomenon of the modern period. According to Modernism, the nation is not a natural socio-political unity but a product of the late 18th and 19th centuries' structural transformations and the emergence of new institutions. The new nation ideas were the result of the modern state's centralization tendencies, industrialization, print-capitalism, and the top-down "invented traditions".

Ethnosymbolism, on the other hand, posits that the modern nation-building processes were informed by pre-modern roots. Mainly championed by Anthony D. Smith, Ethnosymbolism argues that modern nations' formation relied on existing ethnic cores (ethnies) and that the distinctive pre-modern symbols, historical memory, and mythologies were reinterpreted to build modern nations. Thus, the transformation process of the nation concept between 1789 and 1870 relied to a significant extent on politicization and rethinking of existing pre-modern cultural repositories.

While the dichotomy between Modernism and Ethnosymbolism informs the discussion on the origins and cultural memory of nations, both theories, at times, conflate the nation with an object, a group, or a bounded category (groupism). To nuance the discussion, this paper employs the recent theorizing of Rogers Brubaker. Brubaker argues that the nation should not be considered a real group or a substantial category but rather a category of institutionalized practice. He advances the distinction between three main approaches to the concept of the nation (Smith, 2009):

An Institution of Political Classification: Legal and political category administered by states (citizenship, educational systems, etc.)

Dynamic Field of Practice: Contested language and practice by political elites and ordinary people to voice claims of rights, and social reality construction.

A Contingent Event: A sudden crystallization of public opinion in certain events (revolutionary or not).

These three concepts contribute to a multi-layered analysis of the transformation of the concept of the nation in 19th-century Europe. Modernism informs the structural change processes in the political and economic spheres, while Ethnosymbolism provides a cultural history of the nation concept transformation. The account of the nation as an institutional category of practice, however, provides an opportunity to explore the nation in Europe between 1789 and 1870 as a contested and dynamic concept in historical change (Smith, 1986).

Between 1789 and 1870, the concept of the “Nation” underwent a fundamental transformation throughout Europe. It began in France as a revolutionary principle that sought to replace the dynastic foundations of the Old Regime with a new popular sovereignty. As it crossed borders and interacted with different societies, its meaning, boundaries, and value shifted, informing different ideological approaches to nation-building. In Germany, the nation transformed into an organic and ethno-cultural concept that sought to gain political expression in the form of a modern state. The concept of the nation in Italy, however, acted as a socio-political principle that sought to unify different regional identities under one political and cultural idea (Hobsbawm, 1990).

Applying contemporary non-essentialist theoretical approaches to the study of the nation allows historical science to avoid the trap of anachronisms and recognize the nation-building processes as dynamic and multi-layered. Rethinking the 19th-century nation-building processes with an eye on the new socio-theoretical approaches fulfills the requirements of modern historical analysis and helps to provide an objective and critical assessment of political identity-building processes of the era.

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The Problem of Liberalism: Anachronism and a Contextual Approach

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Keywords: *concept of liberalism, anachronism, contextualism, intellectual history*

Açar sözlər: *liberalizm anlayışı, anaxronizm, kontekstualizm, intellektual tarix*

When we attempt to answer the question of the nature of the discipline of history through its practical benefits, we encounter the fact that the degree of precision possessed by the natural sciences is not possible in history in the same way. Although history, as the collective memory of humanity, enables us to make predictions about the future on the basis of past experiences, this cannot be done with mathematical precision. Historical experience only improves our ability to make estimations. On the other hand, one of the areas in which history has a stronger practical impact is politics. However, its appropriation for political purposes may, regardless of the outcome, lead to the distortion of truth (Toynbee, 1963, pp. 94–95). This problem manifests itself particularly clearly in studies of the history of political thought. Addressing the question “What is liberalism?”, Duncan Bell points out that the term is understood in widely divergent, and often mutually incompatible, ways. Approaches to its origins have also differed across different periods.

In this respect, while liberalism was associated with the revolutions of the eighteenth century and capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, at the beginning of the twenty-first century it came to be associated with the Revolution of 1688 and, particularly, with the name of John Locke. The acceptance of John Locke as a foundational figure for liberalism itself emerged as a result of the influence of the Cold War in the 1950s (Bell, 2014, pp. 682–84, 696–99). This means that the concept of liberalism was reshaped on foundations that were not originally historical to it. Helena Rosenblatt's research also shows that for centuries liberalism had been formed as a concept associated more with moral duties and the common good than with individual rights; its contemporary focus on individual rights, however, took shape in the mid-twentieth century, during the Cold War (Rosenblatt, 2018, pp. 4–8, 265–274).

This reshaping was not limited merely to the subsequent elevation of Locke as a foundational figure. Liberalism is usually associated with state-subject relations, individual freedom, and private property. Yet these descriptions are seriously incomplete, and this incompleteness becomes more apparent in historical manifestations. The participation of liberals such as Mill and Tocqueville in colonial governance is a striking example. Their arguments concerning the necessity of governance were not contrary to their liberalism; on the contrary, these arguments were an integral part of their liberalism. This is because liberalism is not merely a theory that defends individual freedom. Also a logic of governance that determines who is to be governed through freedom and who is to be governed by other means (Hindess, n.d., pp. 6–9). This demonstrates that liberalism was formed through particular historical choices, was intertwined with phenomena such as imperialism. That its hegemonic position today is not natural but the result of historical processes.

Quentin Skinner, a representative of the Cambridge School, explains this problem through our expectation that classical works should provide answers to questions that are timeless and valid for all periods. The researcher's approach to the past on the basis of doctrines that exist today and their attempt to find traces of these doctrines in the past undermines their neutrality. As a result, rather than what the author was trying to say, our pre-existing concepts and expectations determine how we read the author's text (Skinner, 1969, pp. 3–10).

The problem is not only the search for modern doctrine in the past. Also the reading of a past author within the “canon of classics” that was formed later. At this point, the historian should not be satisfied with what classical texts say but should analyse them within a broader context. For every text emerges within a particular political language, an environment of debate, and a strategy of legitimation, and it acquires its true meaning only within this context. From this perspective, the task of the intellectual historian is to demonstrate that our values today and our ways of thinking about them originate in choices made among different possibilities available at different periods (Skinner, 1998, pp. 101–5, 116–117).

However, this problem manifests itself not only in approaching the past but also in approaching contemporary concepts. Although historians read past texts carefully, they do not demonstrate the same degree of sensitivity when they turn to contemporary debates; as a result, their analysis remains weak because contemporary literature and concepts are not studied sufficiently. If a historian is speaking about the present, then they must also think, to some extent, as a political theorist or philosopher—because just as history is difficult, political science and philosophy are equally difficult (Blau, 2023, pp. 267–68). This demonstrates that methodological neutrality is

required not only in relation to the past but also in relation to the present.

This means that the past is not merely a mirror that confirms our contemporary concepts; it is also a space that reveals alternative possibilities (Skinner, 1998, p. 117). On this basis, it would be incorrect to claim that liberalism possesses an absolute reality, that it has remained unchanged since the period in which it emerged. That its original form was understood in the same way as it is in the modern period.

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The Balkan Concept of Churchill and Stalin within the Framework of the Second Front Strategy (1943–1945)

Emilya Rahimova 

Keywords: *Balkans, percentages agreement, Tehran conference, Moscow talks, spheres of influence, Iron curtain, Overlord*

Açar sözlər: *Balkanlar, faizlər razılaşması, Tehran konfransı, Moskva danışıqları, nüfuz dairələri, Dəmir pərdə, Overlord*

This study examines the military and diplomatic factors that conditioned the consolidation of Soviet positions in the Balkan Peninsula during World War II. The paper demonstrates that the post-war political landscape of the region was not confined solely to the October 1944 Moscow Talks. Instead, it was a direct continuation of the military decisions reached at the 1943 Tehran Conference.

The text analyzes strategic frictions between the Western Allies, specifically contrasting Winston Churchill's soft underbelly strategy of advancing through the Balkans with Franklin D. Roosevelt's insistence on Operation Overlord in Northern Europe, alongside the geopolitical vacuum this divergence created. Furthermore, it examines the inner workings of the Percentages Agreement concluded between Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, tracing its records in diplomatic visitor logs as well as the strategic memorandums drafted by Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov during the conflict.

The mechanism behind dividing spheres of influence is evaluated comparatively using Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as key case studies. The study relies on primary archival documentation and established historiography.

The military-strategic foundations of expanding Soviet influence in the Balkans were established at the 1943 Tehran Conference. Franklin D. Roosevelt's address regarding the opening of the Second Front played a decisive role in shaping the fate of this region. When addressing the logistical challenges of Operation Overlord planned across the English Channel in Northern Europe, Roosevelt noted that launching large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean would delay the cross-Channel expedition by two or three months. This approach relegated Winston Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which favored an advance into Europe through the Balkans, to a secondary priority. Consequently, the decision by the Western Allies to abandon the Balkan direction due to resource constraints in the Mediterranean basin left the liberation of the region almost entirely to the Red Army. This created ideal conditions for Stalin's subsequent strategy of Sovietization across the region. (Progress Publishers, 1969, pp. 11)

Even during the course of the war, deep conceptual divergences existed between the British and American leadership regarding the military fate of the Balkans. Winston Churchill persistently advocated an offensive through the region, famously describing the Balkans and Southern Europe as the "soft underbelly" of the Axis powers. His primary objective was less about immediate tactical gains and more about geographically curbing post-war Soviet influence. However, Franklin D. Roosevelt rejected the Balkan landing plan, opposing Churchill's strategy of geopolitical hedging. This American stance created a military vacuum in the region, providing Joseph Stalin the opportunity to

establish a sphere of influence reminiscent of the expansion axes he had proposed to Hitler in 1940 (Kissinger, 2007, p. 700).

The strategy established at the Tehran Conference directly influenced the trajectory of subsequent political developments and shifted the regional balance of power during the October 1944 Moscow talks. The division of the Balkan Peninsula into spheres of influence during these negotiations remains one of the most widely debated episodes in the history of international relations. At this juncture, the participating powers reached an informal understanding on the percentage-based division of influence to outline the future political landscape of the region. Archival documentation confirms that the Percentages Agreement was formalized during these historic meetings between Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Joseph Stalin, and Vyacheslav Molotov (*Posetiteli Kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalina*, 1996, p. 87). Proposed by Churchill and grounded in actual Soviet military dominance on the ground, this partition scheme served as a mutual recognition of strategic interests. As a bilateral arrangement dictated by wartime necessity, the agreement defined the boundaries separating Western and Soviet spheres of influence in the Balkans. To minimize the long-term geopolitical fallout of the 1944 Moscow Agreement, Churchill framed the document not as a permanent commitment but merely as a practical guide for the interim period preceding an eventual peace conference (Churchill, 1953, p. 232).

In the end, the Percentages Agreement reached during the Moscow negotiations was in line with Stalin's broader strategic vision, even though at first it seemed to be Churchill's tactical move to defend Greece, a vital hub for British marine lines. As historian Geoffrey Roberts notes, Stalin had no intention of aiding the Greek communists and was fully willing to cede control of Greece to London as part of a larger plan to split

Europe into separate areas of influence, given Britain's crucial interests in the region (Roberts, 2002, p. 8).

Building on this mutual understanding, the Kremlin was able to transform these diplomatic concessions into complete military and political power over the remaining Balkans. The USSR acquired a 50/50 split in Yugoslavia and Hungary, a 90% stake in Romania (with 10% going to the West), and a 75% share in Bulgaria (with 25% going to the West). Despite Churchill's efforts to pitch these percentages to US President Roosevelt as a short-term wartime solution to prevent regional civil unrest, Soviet foreign policy considered this division as the inevitable culmination of a long-term strategy started early in the struggle (Roberts, 2002, p. 2).

In covert memos sent to Stalin as early as 1943–1944, Soviet diplomats Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov had already outlined Europe's post-war geopolitical structure, so this long-term goal was anything but accidental. Maisky envisioned only two superpowers controlling post-war Europe: Great Britain as the dominant naval power and the USSR as the dominating land power. Maisky insisted on establishing military bases in Bulgaria and Romania while purposefully leaving Poland, Hungary, and Turkey in a weak state in order to ensure complete Soviet dominance over the Black Sea (Radchenko, 2024, p. 23).

The Western Allies' abandonment of the Balkan vector at the Tehran Conference, together with the ensuing Percentages Agreement, gave Stalin maximum operational independence in the region, thus fulfilling the strategic basis established by these early documents. Stalin was strategically cautious to avoid upsetting London immediately following the summit in Moscow (Roberts, 2006, p. 217). He most famously suppressed Josip Broz Tito's desire to create a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, a

possible "miniature Soviet Union" that may pose a threat to Moscow as a separate regional powerhouse. In order to maintain direct control over the rate of Sovietization, Stalin advised the Yugoslav delegation on January 9, 1945, to avoid giving the impression that they were absorbing Bulgaria. Instead, he advocated for a dualist structure (Djilas, 1962, pp. 102–105).

This delicate balance quickly broke down, despite Stalin's initial caution, as the agreement's hidden reality caused considerable concern in London near the conclusion of the war. Churchill bemoaned the Soviets' use of force and deceit to create a minority communist dictatorship in Romania in a telegraph issued on March 8, 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, p. 505). Churchill admitted that, despite Stalin's displeasure, Moscow had completely adhered to the deal by granting Britain complete flexibility to save Greece during the 30-day conflict with ELAS in Athens. But in exchange, Stalin was now flagrantly breaking the Yalta Declaration in Bulgaria and Romania. Stalin's counterargument, "I did not interfere with your operations in Greece; why do you not give me the same freedom in Romania?" prevented Churchill from starting an open conflict. In the end, the British leadership decided to use diplomatic pressure through the United States instead of facing the purging of anti-communist elements in Romania under the guise of "anti-fascism" in order to save the considerably more important Polish issue. (Barker, 1976, pp. 222–225).

In summary, this study demonstrates that the shift of military priorities toward Northern Europe at the 1943 Tehran Conference and the Percentages Agreement reached during the 1944 Moscow talks secured absolute geopolitical maneuverability for the USSR in the Balkans. Armed with the freedom of action derived from the Moscow agreement, Joseph Stalin not only consolidated total control over Romania and

Bulgaria but also prevented the emergence of any regional power center independent of Moscow. Consequently, this geostrategic trajectory, laid down at Tehran and formalized in Moscow, became the decisive factor locking the Balkan Peninsula behind the Iron Curtain for decades to come.

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“İki millət” nəzəriyyəsindən islamlaşdırma siyasətinə Pakistanın ictimai-siyasi həyatında İslam dininin rolu

Samir Musayev 

Açar sözlər: *iki millət nəzəriyyəsi, Pakistan, islamlaşdırma, Ziya ül-Haqq, Məqsədlər qətnaməsi, hüddud qanunları*

Keywords: *two-nation theory, Pakistan, Islamization, Zia ul-Haq, conflict of interests, hudud laws*

Pakistan 14 avqust 1947-ci ildə Britaniya Hindistanının bölünməsi nəticəsində müsəlman siyasi millətçiliyinin dövlət formasını aldı. Yaranma əsaslandırması “iki millət” nəzəriyyəsi idi: hindu və müsəlman icmaları təkcə dini cəmiyyətlər deyil, ayrı mədəniyyət, hüquq və siyasi iradəyə malik iki millət sayılırdı. Tezisin məqsədi bu ideyanın müstəmləkə dövründəki təşəkkülündən Ziya ül-Haqqın islamlaşdırma siyasətinə qədər islamın ictimai-siyasi rolunun dəyişməsini göstərməkdir. Məsələ Asiya və Afrika ölkələri tarixində din–millət–ordu üçbucağı baxımından aktualdır və tarixi-müqayisəli üsulla, əsas sənədlər və elmi ədəbiyyat əsasında nəzərdən keçirilir (Jalal, 1985; Talbot, 1998; Haqqani, 2005; Jaffrelot, 2015).

“İki millət” nəzəriyyəsinin ideya kökləri

Nəzəriyyənin erkən zəmini 1857-ci il üsyanından sonra müsəlman elitasının siyasi mövqeyinin zəifləməsi ilə bağlıdır.

Sir Seyid Əhməd Xan hindu-müsəlman siyasi rəqabətini açıq dilə gətirdi; Əliqzar hərəkəti ayrı təhsil və təmsilçilik tələbini möhkəmlətdi. 1906-cı ildə Ümumhindistan Müsəlman Liqasının yaranması fərqliliyi institusional səviyyəyə çıxardı. Məhəmməd İqbal 1930-cu il Allahabad çıxışında şimal-qərb Hindistanda müsəlman əyalətlərinin muxtar birliyini təklif etməklə islamı ayrıca siyasi cəmiyyətin əsası kimi təqdim etdi. 1933-cü ildə Çoudhri Rəhmət Əli “Pakistan” adını irəli sürdü. Cinnah 1937–1940-cı illərdə Liqanı kütləvi təşkilata çevirərək arqumenti seçki və danışiq mübarizəsinin mərkəzinə yerləşdirdi (Jalal, 1985, s. 52–70).

23 mart 1940-cı il Lahor qətnaməsi müsəlman çoxluqlu ərazilərdə müstəqil dövlətlər tələbini rəsmiləşdirdi. 1947-ci ildə Pakistan Dominionu yarandı. Əsas ziddiyyət onda idi ki, Cinnah 11 avqust 1947-ci ildə Təsis Məclisində dinin şəxsi vicdan məsələsi olduğunu, hindu və müsəlmanın vətəndaş olaraq bərabər olacağını vurğuladı. Millət arqumenti islam kimliyinə söykənsə də, elan edilən model hələ teokratik deyildi. Sonrakı onilliklərin siyasi savaşı məhz müsəlman çoxluqlu vətəndaş dövləti ilə islam nizamı ideyası arasında getdi (Haqqani, 2005, s. 10–25).

Konstitusiya prosesi və 1971-ci il sarsıntısı

12 mart 1949-cu il Məqsədlər qətnaməsi suverenliyin Allahda olduğunu, hakimiyyətin isə xalq tərəfindən əmanət kimi həyata keçirildiyini elan etdi və qanunların Quran və Sünnəyə zidd olmamasını siyasi prinsipə çevirdi. 1956-cı il Konstitusiyası ölkəni “Pakistan İslam Respublikası” adlandırdı; 1962-ci il Əyyub Xan Konstitusiyası İslami İdeologiya Şurasını yaratdı. 1973-cü il Konstitusiyası islamı dövlət dini etdi (maddə 2), dövlət başçılarının müsəlman olmasını şərt qoydu. 1974-cü ildə İkinci düzəlişlə əhmədilər qeyri-müsəlman elan olundu.

Beləliklə, “iki millət” ideyası daxildə də sərhəd çəkməyə başladı (Nasr, 1994; Jaffrelot, 2015).

1971-ci ildə Şərqi Pakistanın Banqladeş kimi ayrılması nəzəriyyənin ən ağır sınağı oldu: dil, etnik kimlik və iqtisadi ədalət islam ümumi kimliyindən güclü çıxdı. Qərbi Pakistanda əks reaksiya ideoloji islam vurğusunu sıxlaşdırdı. Ziya ül-Haqqın sonrakı siyasəti bu boşluğu “islam olmasa, Hindistandan ayrılmağın mənası qalmaz” məntiqi ilə doldurmaq iddiası daşıdı (Talbot, 1998, s. 245–260).

Ziya ül-Haqqın islamlaşdırma siyasəti (1977–1988)

5 iyul 1977-ci ildə hakimiyyətə gələn general Məhəmməd Ziya ül-Haqq rejimini “Nizam-e-Mustafa” şüarı ilə legitimləşdirdi. İslamlaşdırma təkcə dini islahat deyil, müxalifətə qarşı ideoloji səfərbərlik və ordu-ulema ittifaqı idi; hüquqi dəyişikliklər çox vaxt simvolik-siyasi xarakter daşıyırdı (Kennedy, 1990). 1979-cu il Hüdud fərmanları oğurluq, zina, içki və qazf üzrə şəriət cəzalarını cinayət hüququna daxil etdi. 1980-ci ildə Zəkat və Üşr fərmanı qəbul olundu, Federal Şəriət Məhkəməsi yaradıldı. 1984-cü il Qanun-e-Şəhadət qadın şahidliyini bir sıra hallarda kişininkinin yarısı qədər saydı. Küfr maddələri (295-B, 295-C) sərtləşdirildi. 1985-ci ildə Məqsədlər qətnaməsi Konstitusiyanın 2-A maddəsi ilə maddi hissəyə çevrildi.

Təhsildə islamiat məcburi fənn oldu, dərsliklərdə “Pakistan ideologiyası” islam mərkəzli yenidən yazıldı, Cinnahın 11 avqust nitqi rəsmi diskursdan sıxışdırıldı. 1979-cu il Əfqanıstan müharibəsi, ABŞ və Səudiyyə dəstəyi mədrəsə şəbəkəsini genişləndirdi. İran İslam inqilabı şiə siyasi şüurunu gücləndirdi; məcburi zəkatın sünni fiqh əsasında tətbiqi 1980-ci ildə şiə etirazına səbəb oldu. Dövlətin “vahid islam” layihəsi beləliklə məzhəb rəqabətini kəskinləşdirdi (Ahmad, 1996; Haqqani, 2005).

İslamın ictimai-siyasi funksiyası və nəticə

Pakistanın ictimai-siyasi həyatında islam üç səviyyədə oxunur. Kimlik səviyyəsində din hindistanlı “o biri”ndən fərqlənmənin və daxildə pəncab, sindhi, puştun, bəluç kimliklərini üstələməyə çalışan üst-millət bağının vasitəsidir. İnstitut səviyyəsində konstitusiyaya müddəaları, şəriət məhkəmələri, İslami İdeologiya Şurası, zəkat bürokratiyası və məcburi dini təhsil dini normanı dövlət aparatına yerləşdirir. Legitimlik səviyyəsində isə həm seçilmiş hökumətlər, həm hərbi rejimlər islam ritorikasından itaət və beynəlxalq müsəlman həmrəyliyi üçün istifadə etmişlər.

Bu funksiyaların sosial qiyməti yüksək olmuşdur: Hüdudun qadınlara qarşı tətbiqi, azlıqların (xristian, hindu, əhmədi) hüquqi müdafiəsizliyi, küfr maddələrinin siyasi alətə çevrilməsi və 1980-ci illərdən sünni-şiə zorakılığının kök atması Ziya irsinin nəticələridir. 2006-cı il Qadınların müdafiəsi qanunu Hüdudu qismən yumşatsa da, küfr qanunvericiliyi və ideoloji dərslik diskursu əsasən qalmışdır. Beləliklə, islamlaşdırma Cinnahın vətəndaş bərabərliyi vurğusundan uzaqlaşaraq “iki millət” ideyasını daxildə də iyerarxik dini sərhədə çevirmişdir (Kennedy, 1990; Jaffrelot, 2015).

Yekun olaraq, islam Pakistanda statik “dövlət dini” olmamışdır. “İki millət” nəzəriyyəsi onu ayrı siyasi millətin əsası etdi; konstitusiyaya prosesi rəsmi ideologiyaya çevirdi; 1971-ci il parçalanması ideoloji sıxlaşmaya yol açdı; Ziya ül-Haqq isə islamı hüquq və təhsilə müdaxilə edən yuxarıdan-aşağı proqramla hərbi hakimiyyəti müqəddəsləşdirdi. Təcrübə göstərir ki, dinin birləşdirici iddiası çoxetnik və çoxməzhəbli cəmiyyətdə avtomatik vəhdət yaratmır; tək şərh üzərindən dövlət islamlaşdırması daxili sərhədləri sərtləşdirir.

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Poso etno-konfessional münaqişəsi (1998–2001): səbəbləri və tənzimlənməsi

Nahid Babayev 

Açar sözlər: *Poso, İndoneziya, etno-konfessional münaqişə, dini kimlik, siyasi rəqabət, Malino I Bəyannaməsi*

Keywords: *Poso, Indonesia, ethno-confessional conflict, religious identity, political competition, Malino I Declaration*

İndoneziyanın Mərkəzi Sulavesi əyalətindəki Poso münaqişəsini müsəlman–xristian qarşıdurması kimi adlandırmaq onun səbəblərini tam açıqlamır. Yerli hakimiyyət və torpaq uğrunda rəqabətin 1998–2001-ci illərdə dini icmalar arasında zorakılığa çevrilməsi həmin maraqların necə əlaqələndiyini araşdırmağı tələb edir. Fikrimizcə, dini mənsubiyyətin səfərbərlikdəki rolu siyasi təmsilçilik və resurslara çıxış münasibətləri daxilində aydınlaşır. Malino I Bəyannaməsinin münaqişənin səbəblərinə nə dərəcədə cavab verdiyi də bu əlaqələr əsasında qiymətləndirilə bilər.

Siyasi təmsilçilik və resurs bölgüsü: H. Büyükbaş və A. N. B. Armin 1998-ci ildə başlanan Reformasi dövrünü İndoneziyanın siyasi quruluşundakı dəyişikliklərlə əlaqələndirirlər (Büyükbaş və Armin, 2025, s. 649). Desentralizasiya qanunları isə 1999-cu ildə qəbul edilmiş, tətbiqinə 2001-ci ildə başlanmışdı (Diprose, 2007, s. 3).

Bu ardıcılıq qanunların həyata keçirilməsini 1998-ci ildə başlayan zorakılığın ilkin səbəbi kimi təqdim etməyə imkan vermir. Posoda rəqabəti gücləndirən yerli münasibətlərin bir hissəsi həmin islahatlardan əvvəl formalaşmışdı.

L. Aragon 1997-ci il iqtisadi böhranından sonra Cənubi Sulavesidən gələn miqrantların kakao yetişdirmək üçün Posoda torpaq aldıklarını qeyd edir. Həmin təhlildə Suharto dövrünün sonunda Pamona gənclərinin bir hissəsinin torpaqsız və işsiz qalması da göstərilir (Aragon, 2001, s. 56). Aragonun qeyd etdiyi bu hallar torpaq uğrunda rəqabətin yerli əhalinin dolanışıq imkanları ilə bağlı olduğunu göstərir.

R. Diprosenin 2005–2006-cı illərdə apardığı müsahibələrdə 1998-ci ilin qarşıdurması ilə əlaqələndirilən narazılıqlardan biri rayon rəhbərliyinin müsəlman və xristianlar arasında qeyri-rəsmi növbələşməsi qaydasının pozulması idi. Müsahibə iştirakçıları dövlət qulluğuna təyinatlara və hökumət layihələrinin bölgüsünə nəzarət edən vəzifələrdən müəyyən qrupların kənarlaşdırıldığını da bildirirdilər (Diprose, 2007, s. 14–15). Sonradan toplanmış bu ifadələr həmin dövrün resurs bölgüsünü dəqiq ölçməyə də, siyasi kənarlaşdırılmanın dini icmanın mənafeyi baxımından qavranıldığını göstərir.

Aragon yerli rəhbərlərin icmalarına iqtisadi imkanlar təmin etməsini Poso administrasiyasında təmsil olunmaqla əlaqələndirir (Aragon, 2001, s. 77). Bu müşahidə Diprosenin təsvir etdiyi vəzifə bölgüsü narazılıqlarının iqtisadi tərəfini aydınlaşdırır.

Etnik mənsubiyyət və dini səfərbərlik: Münaqişədəki dini qrupları sabit “yerli–gəlmə” bölgüsü ilə eyniləşdirmək çətinidir. Diprose bölgədə bir neçə nəsil yaşayan Bugis və Yava mənşəli müsəlmanların da “gəlmə” adlandırıldığını qeyd edir. Pamona və Napu qrupları özlərini bölgənin yerli əhalisi sayır və bu əsasla

digər qruplardan daha çox hüquqa malik olmalı olduqlarını irəli sürürdülər. Müəllif bəzi müsəlman qruplarının «gəlmə» adlandırılmasını da bu mövqe ilə əlaqələndirir (Diprose, 2007, s. 14–15). Beləliklə, “gəlmə” anlayışı məskunlaşma tarixindən əlavə, yerli imkanlara kimin daha çox haqqı olması barədə mübahisəni də ifadə edirdi.

Diprosenin müsahibələrində vəzifə və resurs bölgüsü barədə narazılıqlar dini mənsubiyyət əsasında ifadə olunurdu (Diprose, 2007, s. 14–15). Aragon bəzi müsəlman qaçqınların hadisələri öz dini icmalarına qarşı təhlükə kimi qəbul etdiyini, bəzi protestantların isə qisası dini mətnlərlə əsaslandırıdığını qeyd edir (Aragon, 2001, s. 74–75). Fikrimizcə, bu cür izahlar yerli narazılıqları icmanın müdafiəsi ilə əlaqələndirməklə fərqli maraqları olan insanların birgə hərəkətinə şərait yaradırdı.

Dini həmrəyliyin təşkilati dayaqları da vardı. Aragonun təsvirində Poso şəhərindəki Pamona liderləri Tentenadakı Mərkəzi Sulavesi Protestant Kilsəsinin (GKST) üzvlərindən dəstək alır, sahilyanı müsəlman icmalarında isə Al-Khaira’at şəbəkəsinin əlaqələrindən istifadə olunurdu (Aragon, 2001, s. 77–78). Bu əlaqələr qarşıdurmanın 2000-ci ilin mayından kənd ərazilərinə yayılmasını izah edən amillərdən idi (Aragon, 2001, s. 47, 77).

Təhlükəsizlik qurumlarının mövqeyi də icmaların münasibətlərinə təsir edirdi. Aragon ordu və polis əməkdaşlarının tərəfli iştirakı barədə şahid məlumatlarına istinad edir, lakin münafişənin dövlət tərəfindən birbaşa təşkil edildiyinə dair sübut olmadığını da vurğulayır (Aragon, 2001, s. 50). Buna görə həmin məlumatlar dövlətin vahid münafişə tərəfi olması iddiasından daha çox, onun qərəzsiz təhlükəsizlik təminatçısı kimi qəbul edilməsindəki çətinliyi anlamağa imkan verir.

Malino I Bəyannaməsinin imkanları və məhdudiyyətləri:

19–20 dekabr 2001-ci ildə Jusuf Kallanın vasitəçiliyi ilə keçirilən danışıqlar Malino I Bəyannaməsinin imzalanması ilə nəticələndi (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2001). D. N. Ristanti danışıqların hazırlanmasını yerli xristian liderinin mərkəzi hökumətə müraciəti və icma nümayəndələri ilə ilkin təmasların qurulması ilə əlaqələndirir (Ristanti, 2022, s. 36–37). Ristantinin qeyd etdiyi bu təşəbbüs göstərir ki, danışıqların başlanmasında yerli dini liderlərin də rolu olmuşdu.

Bəyannamənin altıncı bəndi yerli adətlərə hörmətlə bütün İndoneziya vətəndaşlarının Posoda dinc yaşamaq hüququnu tanıyırdı. Diprosenin təhlil etdiyi “yerli–gəlmə” mübahisəsi baxımından bu müddəanı yerli mənşəyə əsaslanan üstünlük iddialarına cavab kimi qiymətləndirmək olar. Yeddinci və səkkizinci bəndlər mülkiyyətin qaytarılmasını və məcburi köçkünlərin geri dönüşünü, doqquzuncu bənd isə iqtisadi bərpanı nəzərdə tuturdu (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2001). Lakin mülkiyyətin əvvəlki sahibinə qaytarılması torpaq bölgüsünün yenidən nəzərdən keçirilməsi öhdəliyi deyildi.

Üçüncü bənddə dövlətin qanunu pozanlara qarşı qərəzsiz tədbirlər görməsi tələb olunurdu. Aragonun təhlükəsizlik qüvvələri barədə qeydləri bu müddəanın etimad problemi ilə əlaqəsini göstərir. Bununla belə, Malino I Aragon və Diprosenin önə çəkdiyi siyasi təmsilçilik və resurs bölgüsü məsələləri üçün ətraflı qaydalar müəyyənləşdirmirdi. Hüquq və asayiş, eləcə də sosial-iqtisadi məsələlər üzrə birgə komissiyalar nəzərdə tutulsa da, vəzifələrə və dövlət müqavilələrinə çıxışla bağlı narazılıqların necə həll ediləcəyi açıqlanmırdı (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2001).

Səfirliyin yaydığı mətn razılaşmanın qəbul edildiyi anda tərəflərin hansı öhdəlikləri götürdüyünü göstərir. Həmin öhdəliklərin davamlı icrası isə sənədin özündən

müəyyənləşdirilə bilməz. Buna görə 2001-ci ilin sonunda bəyannamənin imzalanmasını davamlı sülhün artıq təmin olunması kimi qiymətləndirmək əsaslı olmazdı.

Poso münaqişəsində torpaq və yerli hakimiyyət uğrunda rəqabət dini icmaların maraqları ilə əlaqələndirilirdi. Dini kimlik yerli siyasi-iqtisadi narazılıqları icmanın müdafiəsi ilə əlaqələndirərək səfərbərliyin genişlənməsinə şərait yaradırdı. Malino I təhlükəsizlik, mülkiyyət və məskunlaşma üzrə ortaq öhdəliklər yaratdı. Lakin təmsilçilik və resurs bölgüsü münasibətlərinin yenidən tənzimlənməsi sənəddə ətraflı əks olunmadığından, razılaşmanın əhəmiyyəti ilk növbədə zorakılığın dayandırılması və birgə yaşayışın bərpası üçün qəbul edilmiş prinsiplərdə idi.

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İÇİNDƏKİLƏR

CONTENTS

Birja Bayramova

The Change in the Administrative Affiliation of Zangezur Uyezd (District) in 1920: Historical-Geographical Context and Political-Legal Preconditions 5

Nizami Zeynalov

Nizami və antik dövr Azərbaycan tarixinin bəzi məsələlərinə tənqidi baxış 13

Farah Karimova

Issues in the Study of 19th-Century Iranian History in Azerbaijani Historiography 18

Zahra Mahmudzada

The Problem of Sumerian Origins and Early Turkic Migrations: Historical and Geographical Parallels 26

Khayala Gasimova

Ra and Tengri: Concepts of the Supreme Deity in Ancient Egyptian and Turkic Belief System 32

Javidan Gafarov

The Transformation of the Concept of 'Nation' in Post-Revolutionary Europe (1789–1870): Theoretical and Methodological Approaches 37

Nihad Shirinov

The Problem of Liberalism: Anachronism and a Contextual Approach 42

Emilya Rahimova

The Balkan Concept of Churchill and Stalin within the Framework of the Second Front Strategy (1943–1945) 46

Samir Musayev

“İki millət” nəzəriyyəsiindən islamlaşdırma siyasətinə Pakistanın ictimai-siyasi həyatında İslam dininin rolu 52

Nahid Babayev

Poso etno-konfessional münaqişəsi (1998–2001): səbəbləri və tənzimlənməsi 57

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